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No Moderator Needed:
A Liberty Tradition Right to Broadcast
Advertorials
By DANIEL MATHESON
Broadcasting executives routinely prevent political speech from
reaching the American people, as the nation re-discovered in 2004.
In January, a left-leaning political group sought to broadcast an
advertorial' critical of President Bush, and in November, the United
Church of Christ attempted to extend an "extravagant welcome" to
all persons, "regardless of ability, age, race, economic circumstances,
and sexual orientation., 2 Despite each organization's willingness to
pay the required rate, their submissions were rejected by CBS, a
"public trustee" exercising control over the publicly owned
electromagnetic spectrum. CBS apparently determined that the
public convenience, interest, and necessity3 is served better by
inundating viewers with sophomoric plugs for assorted brands of beer
than by allowing citizens to debate social and political controversies.
So much for the lofty dream that citizens' active and egalitarian
discourse about issues of public importance will lead to
democratically legitimate policy outcomes and the revelation of
political truth.
1. This term was coined by Harvard Law Review, Constitutional Law-Freedom of
Expression-Violation of First Amendment for Radio and Television Stations to Deny
Completely Rroadcasting Time to Editorial Advertisers When Time is Sold To Commercial
Advertisers, 85 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1972).
2. J. Bennett Guess, CBS, NBC Refuse to Air Church's Television Advertisement,
UNITED CHURCH NEWS, Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.ucc.org/news/ul13004a.htm; Jonathan
Darman, Censored at the Super Bowl, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.com/id/4114703.
3. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377, 379, 394 (1969) (discussing
Communications Act mandate that the FCC issue licenses to broadcasters to serve "the
public convenience, interest, and necessity.").
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Perhaps to the surprise of those who believe that speech directly
relevant to a national election occupies a more elevated place in the
hierarchy of communicative activities than the solicitations of
beverage producers,4 CBS's action was far from unique in the annals
of broadcasting.! Various social activists have long been aware that
not even money can buy access to the airwaves if broadcasters
disagree with ones' viewpoint.6  This Article argues that such
viewpoint-based refusals to broadcast political speech represent a
constitutional violation, based on four propositions that find solid
support in modern First Amendment doctrine:
1. CBS v. DNC7 is no longer persuasive due to changes in the
regulatory regime, specifically the abrogation of the fairness doctrine;
2. The transmission of an advertisement does not represent the
"speech" of a broadcaster because advertisements are not socially
understood to associate the broadcaster with the message;
3. When political speech and commercial speech have identical
effects on a public forum, speech cannot be excluded due solely to its
political nature, and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights8 has been
misinterpreted to the extent it has been used to suggest otherwise;
4. Recent cases construing Marsh v. Alabama9 establish that
private actors who manage public property operate "public fora," and
the First Amendment restricts the manner in which they may
discriminate between speakers.
I. Introduction
"Civic republicans" have already articulated an approach to
4. Countless editorials condemned the action and seemed unaware that similar
refusals to air editorial advertisements are common. See, e.g., Editorial, Let Them Play,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 29, 2004, at A22. See also, Statement of Senator
Richard Durbin, (Jan. 27, 2004), http://moveon.org/cbs//durbin.html; Letter from Sen.
Wyden to CBS Television President Mr. Leslie Moonves (Jan. 24, 2004) (on file with
author).
5. It wasn't even unique in the 2004 Super Bowl. People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals also sought to broadcast ads, but following their rejection they were less
successful than Moveon.org in obtaining publicity.
6. An interesting example is provided by a charmingly radical group known as
"Adbusters." Adbusters has long sought to purchase television advertising time to
lampoon consumption they see as wasteful and consumers they view as brainwashed by
television. So far, however, Adbusters' submissions have been rejected by all the major
United States broadcasting networks. http://www.mediacarta.org/thebattlel.html.
7. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
8. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
9. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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broadcasting regulation designed to preserve the pre-conditions for
participatory democracy. Appealing as their conclusions may be, I
believe that current First Amendment doctrine will not support a
constitutional challenge to the broadcasting system based on the role
that broadcasting should play in the public communicative sphere.'
Two developments-one technological, one jurisprudential-
highlight the need for an alternative approach to broadcasting
regulation if the Constitution is to prevent a handful of voices from
dominating public discourse."
Technologically, the explosion in alternative means of mass
communication has undermined the "scarcity" rationale, which
justified government regulation of broadcasters because "there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate. 12  The empirical validity of the doctrine is
now so weak that the Court may have to abandon altogether the use
of spectrum scarcity to justify pervasive state involvement in
broadcasting.13 The erosion of support for the scarcity doctrine has
led some to suggest that broadcasting's singular pervasiveness and
"the unique role that television plays in the public discourse"
provides an alternative justification for extensive regulation." This
pervasiveness rationale may currently provide ammunition for those
of the civic republican persuasion, but it is far from analytically
unassailable, and a theory of First Amendment rights based on
networks' share of the audience may be rendered unpersuasive by
even modest technological or behavioral change.
More fundamentally, arguments rooted in communitarian
10. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 22 (1995) ("Sociologists have defined this sphere as a shared 'universe of
discourse'...." (quoting Carroll D. Clark, Concept of the Public, 13 Sw. SOC. ScI. 0. 311,
313 (1933))).
11. The best definition of the "public discourse" that comprises the primary end of
the First Amendment seems to me to be Professor Post's: "those forms of communication
that are deemed necessary to ensure that a democratic state remains responsive to the
views of its citizens." Id. at 4.
12. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). The scarcity doctrine has
also been attacked on the basis of its inherent circularity. Professor Yoo persuasively
argues that "relying on scarcity effectively allows regulation to serve as the constitutional
justification for additional regulation ... . [creating] a theory that allows the overriding
culture of regulation to become self-enforcing." Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise
of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 253
(2003).
13. See Yoo, supra note 12. See also, On the Same Wavelength, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14,
2004, at 62; Bandwidth from Thin Air, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1999.
14. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 252.
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concerns will necessarily have a limited impact on doctrine because
the judiciary has adopted individual liberty as the lodestar of First
Amendment doctrine. Our broadcasting regime was originally
structured with the intent of facilitating the public's exposure to at
least some types of political speech, and it advanced civic republicans'
cause reasonably well under a regime of pervasive regulation that
limited broadcasters' discretion. However, aggressive administrative
oversight of broadcasters has largely come to an end, at least in part
because First Amendment doctrine now emphasizes the rights of
individuals (and corporations) to be free from restraint. A focus on
the autonomy of individuals provides a poor basis for active
government regulation of the public communicative sphere, even
when the government's intention is to promote the overall quantity
and quality of informative discourse. Unfortunately, the system of
broadcasting regulation produced by a retreat from communitarian
concerns and an increased emphasis on individuals' rights has not
only failed to address civic republicans' objections, it has proven
woefully inadequate to preserve individuals' ability to actively
participate in public discourse. This Article attempts to address both
of these concerns, but not by referencing communitarian values. I
approach the regulation of broadcasting from an individualist
perspective and conclude that broadcasters' viewpoint-based refusal
to sell advertising time is unconstitutional because the First
Amendment can and should be interpreted to restrict the manner in
which the manager of public property designed for discourse can
regulate speech.
The political tradition's goal of using the First Amendment to
promote public discourse can be served without a "New Deal" for
speech. 5 Viewpoint diversity in public discourse and individual
access to the public communicative sphere can be achieved through a
principled reliance on public forum doctrine coupled with an
understanding that private actors may not manage public property in
a manner that thwarts core First Amendment guarantees. A focus on
15. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 53-
91 (1995). Professor Sunstein describes "market failures" endemic in the modem
broadcasting environment, and suggests that these failures undermine the "Madisonian
conception of free speech," which "place[s] a high premium on political... equality and on
the deliberative function of politics." Id. at xvii. He then enumerates regulations that
might advance these goals, suggesting that a "free speech New Deal" is possible based on
the understanding that "what seems to be government regulation of speech might, in some
circumstances, promote free speech as understood through the democratic conception
associated with both Madison and Brandeis." Id. at 35.
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individuals' rights provides the strongest basis for inferring a
constitutional right of access to the airwaves not only because such an
approach is consistent modern First Amendment doctrine, but
because it directly references the constitutional prohibition on laws
abridging individuals' freedom of speech-thus allowing federal
courts to take action without fatal deference to legislative and
administrative definitions of "the public interest."
Part II frames the tension between two venerable philosophies of
the First Amendment and sets forth my reasons for adopting an
approach centered on individual autonomy to address our current
broadcasting regime's spectacular failure to respond to the concerns
of either individualists or communitarians. Part III demonstrates that
CBS v. DNC is inapposite to modern broadcasting due to the
abandonment of the fairness doctrine 6 upon which the opinion relied,
but argues that CBS v. DNC has enduring importance because it
accepted two propositions central to the current debate: the right of
individuals to speak and not merely to listen must be given some
weight in broadcasting regulation, and the sale of time to third parties
does not implicate the editorial discretion of broadcasters.
Part IV demonstrates that under current doctrine a time segment
offered for sale to a third party constitutes a doctrinally cognizable
public forum distinct from the programming that brackets it and that
advertisements do not represent the "speech" of broadcasters. Part
IV then argues that a broadcaster's refusal to accept noncommercial
speech is an unreasonable prior restraint, and that cases including
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights'7 firmly establish that the
discrimination should be labeled viewpoint-based rather than
content-based.
Part V applies Marsh v. Alabama'8 to the broadcast-access debate
based on an interpretation that has become increasingly compelling
due to recent cases relying on and clarifying Marsh; property owners
and forum managers cannot discretionarily exclude speakers when
the property has been held out to the public as a forum appropriate
for discourse.
16. The fairness doctrine "require[d] a station which present[ed] one side of a
controversial issue of public importance to afford reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of significant contrasting viewpoints on the issue in its overall programming.
.... In re Complaint by Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242,
244 (1970). See infra, Part III.A.
17. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
18. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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II. The Liberty Tradition and the Political Tradition
Sophisticated commentators have already argued for increased
government regulation of the broadcast media to improve the public's
access to information, the quality of programming, or the diversity of
viewpoints presented to the public at large. Professor Sunstein has
articulately made the case for active government management (a
"New Deal For Speech") to promote the "Madisonian goal" of
unmasking political truth through the democratic deliberation of
politically equal citizens, 9 while others including Professor Bork have
questioned the modern mass media's tendency to erode traditional
social mores and generally degrade the quality of public discourse."
This latter theme runs throughout both the popular and academic
literature, even if most choose to focus on the absence of depth and
erudition in public debate rather than take Professor Bork's overtly
values-based approach to the issue. The case has already been made
that broadcasters expose children to excessive amounts of violence,
misinform the public by focusing on political scandals and
sensationalism rather than substantive policy, portray women as
generally subordinate to men, and so on.21 It is popular to cite the
woeful state of public discourse en route to an argument that First
Amendment values are best served by active state management of the
medium in which so much public debate occurs.
I sympathize with the goals of this camp, but decline to rely on
the arguments they have so ably put forward because whether or not
the First Amendment should allow for more extensive regulation of
program content, the Court's modern cases suggest that a minor
jurisprudential revolution would be required if state actors are to
control program content. As a general matter, the Court has adopted
a philosophy of the First Amendment that focuses on the individual's
right to participate in debate and be free from restraint, rather than a
civic republican approach focusing primarily on the communitarian or
democratic values advanced by public discourse.22 The "liberty
19. SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at xvii.
20. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GEMORRAH 123-53 (1996).
21. See, e.g., NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 66-67.
22. Professor Post, for instance, suggests that Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309-310 (1940) (protecting from a breach of peace conviction an individual's right to play
in public an anti-Catholic recording deemed offensive by two listeners), illustrates the
primacy of individual autonomy in our First Amendment doctrine. Cantwell elevates
individual freedom over communitarian concerns such as maintaining social harmony and
ensuring that debate actually serves to inform the public:
tradition" of First Amendment interpretation "which sees the
constitutional protection of free speech in broader terms as a basic
individual right recognized by a political society committed to
liberty"23 has for the most part prevailed over the "political tradition,"
whose position can be characterized (perhaps simplistically) as "only
speech that is required for the exercise of self-government qualifies
for protection under the First Amendment."2  The judiciary's
sensitivity to the dangers of speech regulation, even when the speech
is concededly offensive and threatens to undercut legitimate policy
aims, presents a practically insurmountable obstacle to a government
attempt to dictate the content of programming-even when the state
possesses the laudable goal of ensuring a better-informed public more
capable of engaging in intelligent democracy.
A. The Political Tradition, Broadcasting Regulation, and the Decline of
Scarcity
The liberty tradition has not invariably triumphed in the
broadcasting context; the federal government has historically
The individual is the locus of value for Cantwell .... In interpreting the Constitution
in light of the values and assumptions of individualism, Cantwell speaks for what
unquestionably has become the great tradition of First Amendment thought. Of
course there have been dissenting voices in that tradition, but it is fair to
characterize [them] as ripples on the surface of a deeper and more powerful current
of individualist decisions.
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 105 (1995). Professor Post here contrasts
Cantwellian individualism to the competing approaches of "pluralism" and
"assimilationism," not the political tradition with the liberty tradition. However, the
Court's acceptance of the individual as the central focus of the First Amendment to some
extent necessitates the rejection of a political tradition approach allowing active
governmental direction of public discourse, as Professor Post demonstrates in his
discussion of laws punishing group libel. See id. at 11.
23. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J.
373, 373 (1993).
24. Id. This characterization is consistent with other pithy analyses of the tradition,
such as Professor Fiss's: "We allow people to speak so others can vote." OWEN M. FISS,
LIBERALISM DIVIDED 13 (1996). However, it may unfairly represent some great writers
of the political tradition as insensitive to the values of the liberty tradition because it
ignores the social and historical context in which this strain's most celebrated proponents
wrote. Professor Meiklejohn offered a philosophically persuasive argument in favor of a
robust First Amendment in the face of Red Scare-era restrictions that threatened to leave
core political speech unprotected. Professor Sunstein developed an approach to the First
Amendment that encouraged a multiplicity of viewpoints in the face of Reagan-era
broadcasting deregulation that threatened-and in fact has accomplished-the transfer of
control over public discourse to a powerful few while denying a broader class of citizens
the opportunity to either participate in the debate or effectively digest a broad spectrum of
information.
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exercised substantially more control over broadcast speech than
speech utilizing other media, and such restrictions have been upheld
based on the political tradition's rationales,2m most importantly in Red
Lion.26 When the Court has accepted active state involvement to
promote the political tradition's goals, however, it has done so on the
basis of technological circumstances that are increasingly irrelevant to
modern broadcasting. Even the staunchest communitarians have
conceded that Red Lion is aberrational, 27 and given the aggressive
academic assaultm on the scarcity rationale, it appears as if the Red
Lion Court may have elevated the public's interest in receiving
information over broadcasters' interest in unfettered speech during a
'Meiklejohnian moment' that has passed.29
The Court invited a fresh challenge to the scarcity doctrine as
early as 1984, suggesting the Justices would "reconsider our
longstanding approach" if they received "some signal from Congress
or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far
that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be
required."-' The federal courts received the requested signals from
the FCC in 198531 and 198732, but when squarely faced with the issue
25. Compare NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) and Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974).
26. 395 U.S. at 390. Based primarily on spectrum scarcity, the Red Lion Court
rejected a strictly individualistic view of First Amendment freedoms and upheld the
fairness doctrine's restrictions on broadcasters' speech, pronouncing "it is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id.
27. OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 72 (1996) (noting that Red Lion's
basis in the scarcity doctrine renders it a "formal vestige of another era, soon to be
overtaken by technological advances").
28. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 12. See also Charles W. Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity:
A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 1687 (1997); R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse,
Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public
Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 299 (1993).
29. Conversation with Professor Don Herzog, University of Michigan Law School,
(March 18, 2004).
30. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984).
31. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, In the Matter of Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145, 204-17 (Aug. 23, 1985) (detailing
increase in number of stations and the emergence of cable television, and suggesting that
the proliferation in outlets had undermined the basis for spectrum scarcity).
32. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
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in Metro Broadcasting,33 the Supreme Court declined the FCC's
invitation to reconsider the "application of diminished First
Amendment protection to the electronic media" in light of "the
dramatic transformation in the telecommunications marketplace.""
Metro Broadcasting "can hardly be regarded as a ringing
endorsement of Red Lion, ,15 however, because it had little to do with
broadcasters' First Amendment rights; the central issue was the
appropriate level of scrutiny applied to federal programs encouraging
minority ownership of broadcasting stations. The scarcity doctrine
was not cited as a basis for controlling the content of broadcasters'
speech, it merely provided a reason that the government might be
more concerned about minority ownership of broadcasting stations
than other media outlets.36
Since 1990, the Justices have neither unreservedly reaffirmed nor
explicitly rejected scarcity as a basis for broadcasting regulation. The
Court has noted its reliance on the scarcity doctrine in dicta,37 but
according to Professor Yoo, "a close reading of subsequent decisions
reveals that the Court has severely limited [the scarcity doctrine's]
scope."38 The Court's recent broadcasting jurisprudence indicates a
marked reluctance to allow the FCC to interfere with editorial
discretion in the absence of a compelling state interest unless the
speech at issue "lies at the periphery of First Amendment concern.,
39
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court allowed a broadcaster to be
sanctioned for airing an "indecent" George Carlin monologue, but
took care to "emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding"' and
significantly, failed to cite the scarcity rationale as the cornerstone of
broadcasting regulation. The Court instead focused on broadcast
33. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
34. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5058.
35. Yoo, supra note 12, at 287.
36. Analysts interested in the Court's decision-making process might also note that
the Court was forced to sanction the scarcity doctrine in order to achieve its desired equal
protection outcome because Justice White "made a reaffirmation of Red Lion the price of
his vote in Metro Broadcasting." Id. (citing Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the
Search for the Public Trustee, 56-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 179 (1993)).
37. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) ("The justification for
our distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical limitations of
the broadcast medium. As a general matter, there are more would-be broadcasters than
frequencies available in the electromagnetic spectrum.").
38. Yoo, supra note 12, at 253, 288-92.
39. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978).
40. Id. at 750.
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programs' accessibility to children,' and the monologue's indecency.
Even these non-scarcity based rationales are less than compelling.
The Court has long cautioned that the state may not "reduce the
adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children," 3 and has
generally instructed those who might be offended to avert their eyes.
4
These principles have recently been reaffirmed with respect to cable
television programs, which may be no less invasive of the home and
no less accessible to children than programs broadcast over the
publicly owned airwaves. 5
Under current doctrine the FCC has rather limited powers. It is
able to demand that broadcasters provide more of a certain type of
programming (for example, children's programming'), or that
broadcasters carry certain types of third-party speech (for example,
political candidates' ads4 7). However, sanctions may not be imposed
for anything other than patently offensive content; content
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny,48 and prior restraints may not
be imposed. Although the Court has yet to explicitly abandon the
scarcity doctrine, the increasing weight granted to broadcasters'
editorial discretion indicates that, even in the broadcasting context,
the First Amendment now primarily operates to guarantee the
individual autonomy prized by the liberty tradition, rather than to
41. Id. at 749.
42. Id. at 739-42. See also Yoo, supra note 12, at 249 ("Had the Court failed to
recognize these two grounds for upholding more intrusive regulation of broadcasting, it is
almost certain that the principal features of the broadcasting model would not have
withstood constitutional scrutiny.").
43. Butler v. Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (holding that state may not broadly suppress speech--outdoor
tobacco advertising--directed to adults in order to protect children); Reno v. ACLU, 512
U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (holding that non-obscene sexual material is protected speech that
adults have a First Amendment right to access on the internet).
44. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
45. Id.
46. 47 U.S.C. §303b(a)(2) (2000) (FCC Regulations promulgated under the
Children's Television Act require that all analog channels provide at least three hours of
children's programming per week. 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(d) (2006). Subsection (e), which
would have extended this requirement to digital stations was stayed effective Feb 1, 2006.
47. Broadcasters must allow legally qualified candidates for federal office "reasonable
access to [the use of a broadcasting station] or... permit purchase of reasonable amounts
of time." 47 U.S.C. §312(a)(7) (2000). They may refuse to carry advertisements by
candidates for state and local offices, but if they carry any ads, they must do so on a
nondiscriminatory basis. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Evergreen Media Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1183, 1184 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
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promote the intelligent and constructive discourse that is the
aspiration of the political tradition.
B. The Advantages of Applying the Liberty Tradition to the
Broadcasting Access Debate
It is possible to conceive of the competing claims to the
broadcast spectrum in two ways: the conflict could be between the
broadcasters and those other parties who are not granted control over
the spectrum, or it could be a conflict between non-broadcasters
(advertisers) allowed access and non-broadcasters denied access."
1. Broadcasters Against Advertisers
Broadcasters' speech rights conflict with individuals' claims of
access if broadcasters' First Amendment freedoms are implicated by
the images they transmit for third parties. If the debate is framed in
this way, the liberty tradition is singularly unhelpful in constructing a
right of access, but at least it is clear. Cantwell and its progeny' °
instruct us that freedom of speech shall not be abridged absent a
government interest as compelling as that found in traditionally
recognized narrow exceptions.51  'Balancing' individuals' First
Amendment rights against other concerns, such as the public's right
to hear competing viewpoints, is anathema to the liberty tradition. 2
The political tradition appears more helpful because it allows the
claims of broadcasters to be weighed against the claims of those
seeking access in order to determine where access rights should be
located to promote public discourse. Unfortunately, discoverable
standards about how to balance these competing claims are
noticeably absent. Even if this decision is to be made, it is not clear
that the judiciary is in the best position to make it-how does the
First Amendment instruct the Court (rather than Congress) to go
about making a determination about who should be empowered to
49. Current doctrine compels the latter interpretation of the competing claims, as
Part III.D.4 and Part IV.D. reveal.
50. See POST, supra note 22, at 105.
51. Widely recognized examples include falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre and
causing a panic, publishing troop movements during time of war, and threats on the life of
the president.
52. It can be argued that a balancing determination must be made in the liberty
tradition's terms, since the emphasis the modem Supreme Court places on preserving
"editorial discretion" surely arises from a Cantwellian sensitivity rather than
communitarian concerns. As Part IV will make clear, however, advertising time does not
fall within the ambit of editorial discretion.
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say what in order to make sure that Madisonian values or
Jeffersonian democracy are most effectively advanced?53 Although
courts often mention the importance of public debate or the value of
an informed public, the First Amendment consistently has been
interpreted as imposing restraints rather than affirmative duties on
state actors. The judiciary lacks a principled basis on which to
interfere with procedurally legitimate decisions unless government
action violates the core guarantee of the First Amendment that
Congress shall not abridge the freedom of speech.
2. Advertisers Against Advertisers
Alternatively, the parties asserting conflicting rights to the
electromagnetic spectrum can be viewed, not as the broadcasters and
excluded individuals, but as non-broadcasters allowed access and
non-broadcasters denied access. On this view, the broadcaster makes
the decision about who to include and who to exclude, but the
broadcaster does not have a First Amendment interest at stake. If
the broadcaster is a state actor and the advertising slot at issue
represents a forum of some sort, the liberty tradition provides an easy
answer: the broadcaster can base the decision to exclude only on a
content or viewpoint-neutral basis (depending on the nature of the
forum). The political tradition, on the other hand, accepts that
someone may make content-based or viewpoint-based judgments to
further egalitarian democratic deliberation, so the political tradition
would be forced to provide a reason that broadcasters are a
particularly bad entity to exercise this discretion (as opposed to, say,
an administrative body that may be subject to political pressures).
The invocation of the liberty tradition thus offers an obvious
advantage in constructing a right of access because it obviates the
need to worry about such questions of institutional capacity.
However, the absolutist liberty tradition approach of this Article is
not adopted merely out of convenience, nor because of dogmatic
libertarianism. Rather, the liberty tradition provides a more
53. Perhaps I have overstated the case that the political tradition always requires
balancing competing claims-certainly political tradition luminaries such as Alexander
Meiklejohn and Justice Black believed in First Amendment absolutes. See Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 248 (1961)
(quoting Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 874-75 (1960)). But the
problem with attempting to apply the political tradition in this particular context is that
the broadcast-access debate does not present a situation in which a restriction results in a
net reduction of potentially socially valuable speech, it involves an attempt to resolve the
competing claims of different speakers.
appropriate framework because I advocate judicial rather than
administrative action to remedy the viewpoint-based discrimination
endemic in our current broadcasting regime, and the judiciary can
locate constitutional imperatives and institutional capacity more
readily from within the framework of the liberty tradition.
III. Haven't We Been Through This Before?-Why CBS v.
DNC Requires Reconsideration
In 1973, the Burger Court held that the First Amendment
permitted radio and television broadcasters to refuse to carry
advertorials dealing with controversial issues of public importance.
So, it might reasonably be asked, hasn't the existence of a
constitutional right to access the broadcast medium already been
settled? The answer is no, for several reasons.
First, and least disputably, the Court's decision rested in large part
on the existence of the fairness doctrine, which the FCC repudiated in
1987."5 Second, the FCC's Cullman doctrine (also abandoned)56
distorted the question before the CBS Court because it forced
broadcasters to risk sacrificing control over the content of their own
programming if they accepted advertorials. Third, the Court accepted
that in the broadcasting context it was appropriate to defer to
congressional and administrative interpretations of the First
Amendment's guarantees. Perhaps such a conclusion was justified in
1973 because, at that time, the FCC at least attempted to actively
supervise broadcasters to ensure that the First Amendment goals
envisioned by the Communications Act were realized, but broadcasters
now operate with far less oversight. The Court's earlier deference
today would be an unforgivable abdication of the judicial responsibility
to afford a more limited "presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.,
57
54. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
55. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987). The fairness doctrine "require[d] a station
which present[ed] one side of a controversial issue of public importance to afford
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of significant contrasting viewpoints on the
issue in its overall programming." In re Complaint by Business Executives Move for
Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242, 244 (1970).
56. The Cullman doctrine extended the fairness doctrine to paid-for advertorials. See
infra, notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
57. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The purpose of this Section is to not to demonstrate that the
Court would be forced to sustain an identical challenge brought
today.8 Rather, this Section has three limited aims: to highlight the
influence of the political tradition on the outcome of the litigation; to
establish that CBS v. DNC is no longer persuasive due to changes in
the regulatory regime; and to suggest that two points of importance
survive despite the collapse of the fairness doctrine.
A. Broadcasters as Public Trustees
In 1970, the FCC regarded "the licensing of private entities
under the public interest standard" as the "heart of the system of
broadcasting. '"5 9 The fundamental assumption was that broadcasters
were "public trustees," who possessed the twofold obligation "to
devote a reasonable amount of time to public issues and to do so
fairly."6 Broadcasters possessed a substantial amount of discretion
over the arrangement of their programming, but individuals could
bring suits based on the fairness doctrine or the Cullman doctrine
alleging violations of a broadcaster's duty to cover public issues in a
balanced manner.
The fairness doctrine "require[d] a station which present[ed] one
side of a controversial issue of public importance to afford reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of significant contrasting viewpoints
on the issue in its overall programming., 61 If a broadcaster's coverage
of an issue was found to violate the fairness doctrine, the station
could be required to provide airtime free of charge to an advocate of
the viewpoint that had been discriminated against. Because of this
potentially stiff penalty, the FCC granted each broadcaster
considerable leeway and required them only to exercise "reasonable,
58. At least two important questions have been reserved. The state action question
will be addressed in Section V; if an individual right to broadcast advertorials can be
found, CBS v. DNC must be proven unpersuasive before broaching the issue of state
action. Broadcasters were treated as if they were state actors at all three phases of CBS v.
DNC litigation. (The Supreme Court majority avoided deciding the issue but assumed
state action was present for the purposes of argument.) Furthermore, throughout the
litigation the ban on controversial advertisements was viewed as a viewpoint-neutral ban
on issue ads that were unrelated to messages being sent by other advertisers rather than as
a viewpoint-discriminatory prior restraint. The failure of the Court and the FCC to
recognize that viewpoints on an issue can be presented by speech that deals with the issue
only tangentially will be addressed in Section IV.
59. In re DNC, 25 F.C.C. 2d 216, 221 (1970).
60. Id. at 222 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394).
61. In re Complaint by Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d
242,244 (1970).
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good faith judgment in applying the fairness doctrine to a particular
issue or issues." 62 The FCC's reluctance to engage in detailed fairness
doctrine inquiries and thereby "substitute its judgment for that of the
licensee, 63 was understandable, but was only implicated in the
complaints at issue in CBS v. DNC because the FCC's Letter to
Cullman Broadcasting Co. extended the fairness doctrine to paid-for
advertorials. 6' Under the Cullman doctrine, if a broadcaster's overall
programming did not present viewpoints opposing the viewpoint of a
paid-for advertorial, the station might have to offer free airtime to a
speaker who opposed the advertorial's viewpoint.
The validity and propriety of the Cullman doctrine were
automatically accepted during consideration of the cases involved in
CBS v. DNC. This, in part, explains the ultimate outcome of the
cases. The Cullman doctrine made some sense given the underlying
rationale of the fairness doctrine-broadcasters were public trustees
whose editorial discretion only encompassed the power to determine
how (not if) relevant viewpoints would be presented to the public.
And given the Cullman doctrine, the holding in CBS v. DNC also
makes sense. If a broadcaster were forced to rebut the views of any
advertorial it accepted, the broadcaster would face a difficult choice;
either rebut the advertorial during its own programming (which
would interfere with the editorial discretion of a broadcaster to
determine how viewpoints were to be presented and how much time
would be devoted to each issue) or sacrifice advertising revenue by
offering free airtime to an opponent of an advertorial.
B. DNC and BEM Before the Federal Communications Commission
CBS v. DNC found its way to the Supreme Court as a result of
two opinions issued by the FCC on August 5, 1970. In re DNC arose
when the Democratic National Committee (DNC) sought a
declaratory ruling that "a broadcaster may not, as a general policy,
refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such as DNC, for the
solicitation of funds and for comment on public issues." 66 In re BEM
62. Id. at 245.
63. Id. (quoting Letter to Mrs. Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647 (1965)).
64. See In re DNC, 25 F.C.C. 2d at 225.
65. Id. The broadcaster could avoid this if an opponent of the advertorial would pay
for the privilege of rebutting, but the moral hazard problem was clearly immense; who
would pay for airtime they could get free by simply asserting that they were unwilling to
pay for it?
66. In re DNC, 25 F.C.C.2d at 216.
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represented an as-applied challenge: Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace (BEM) sought to purchase one-minute segments of
radio airtime on WTOP-AM to advocate "immediate withdrawal of
American forces from Vietnam and from other overseas military
installations." 67 When their requests were refused by WTOP due to
the station's "long established policy of refusing to sell spot
announcement time to individuals or groups to set forth views on
controversial issues," 68 BEM filed a complaint with the FCC alleging
(1) WTOP had violated the fairness doctrine, (2) WTOP had violated
the First Amendment, and (3) the FCC's refusal to force WTOP to
carry its advertorial constituted a First Amendment violation.
1. In re DNC
DNC challenged their exclusion based on "constitutional,
statutory, and public policy grounds., 69 The FCC's opinion rendered
the attempt to mount three distinct challenges futile, however,
because "[many of] the policies embodied by Congress in the 'public
interest' standard of the Act.. .were drawn from the First
Amendment itself; [therefore the statutorily imposed] 'public interest'
standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment
principles., 70 Furthermore, the FCC was legally unable to make a
determination of the Communications Act's constitutionality because
"it is beyond the power of an administrative agency to declare its
governing statute to be unconstitutional., 7' Thus, the three-pronged
challenged collapsed into a single inquiry: was the ability of networks
to exclude controversial advertorials "in the public interest" from the
point of view of the then-ascendant political tradition?72
The FCC's opinion is thus horrifying to the liberty tradition.
Take, for example, DNC's pyrrhic victory: the FCC was saved from
making a binding declaration on the solicitation prong of DNC's
request by the concessions of NBC,73 CBS,74 and ABC75, which each
67. In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d at 242.
68. Id.
69. In re DNC, 25 F.C.C.2d at 217.
70. CBS, 412 U.S. at 122.
71. In re DNC, 25 F.C.C.2d at 227.
72. Red Lion controlled the First Amendment inquiry, and it was therefore accepted
that the "right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the
government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast
his own particular views on any matter, [was] the foundation stone of the American
system of broadcasting." Id. at 223.
73. NBC never had a "policy against the sale of time to a major national political
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took the opportunity to promulgate policies that explicitly
discriminated against potential speakers based on identify. The
networks retained their policies against selling time for comment on
controversial issues, but made exceptions for major national political
parties. The FCC majority approved "that treatment, 7 6 despite the
fact that such a policy can hardly pass the most cursory First
Amendment scrutiny. As the Supreme Court subsequently queried,
what was the "principled means under the First Amendment of
favoring access by organized political parties over other groups and
individuals"?7 7 Even more anathema to the liberty tradition was the
posture of DNC's request for time to comment on public issues.
DNC conceded that "under the Red Lion standard reasonable
restrictions by broadcasters are permissible-e.g., limitation of use of
broadcast facilities to responsible spokesmen and protection against
use of facilities for libelous presentations or those in bad 'taste'. 78 If
any criterion allows more leeway for the formation of opinion than
the determination of who represents a "responsible spokesman" for a
particular viewpoint, it can only be the inherently subjective standard
of "taste." Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is exactly what a well-
established and mainstream group such as DNC wanted, but the
concession that only some groups should be allowed to speak on only
some issues conceded the legitimacy of licensee-imposed prior
restraints. DNC's challenge was doomed from the start.
A challenge brought from within the framework of the political
tradition was destined to fail given the FCC's assumption that the
fairness doctrine prevented the exclusion of relevant alternative
party to be used for the solicitation of funds for the party." Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
74. CBS initially rejected DNC's request because it "occurred outside an election
campaign," but revised its policy to "permit the purchase during any period by a political
party of spot announcements (not to exceed one minute in length) designed to solicit funds
for the party." Id. (emphasis added).
75. ABC retained its general policy against selling time for "comment on
controversial issues or for solicitation of funds," but made a concession to DNC: "Because
the strength and viability of the major political parties are vitally important, ABC would
... accept such orders for time from major political parties as can be accommodated on a
reasonable basis." Id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 229. The FCC majority reasoned that "[it] requires no discussion to
establish that political parties are an integral part of our democratic process and that it
serves the public interest to promote the widest possible support by citizens of the party of
their choice."
77. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 127 n.21 (1973).
78. In re DNC, 25 F.C.C. 2d at 217.
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viewpoints from the airwaves.79 Commissioner Johnson's impassioned
dissent, attempting to introduce public forum precedents, was
therefore rejected because of the "public duty adhering to the
acceptance of a license to give adequate coverage to public issues
which reflects opposing viewpoints, if necessary at the broadcaster's
own expense."' Broadcasters' affirmative obligations to present all
viewpoints were thus used to dismiss the application of fundamental
public forum principles forbidding prior restraints based on speaker
identity or message content.8' This was considered an outcome in the
public interest because it limited the impact of money on the public's
receipt of information: if broadcasters were forced to accept
advertorials dealing with controversial issues and then give
proportional coverage to the opposing view, one interested bloc with
sufficient funding could dictate the subject to which a broadcaster
would have to devote practically all of its time. 2
DNC's challenge was made from within the confines of the
public trustee paradigm, implicitly accepted licensee discretion over
the allocation of advertising time, and succeeded only in generating
disagreement between the FCC and the Court of Appeals about who
should decide when the optimal level of content discrimination had
been reached (the FCC left the decision to the licensee-the Court of
Appeals wanted the FCC to supervise 83). BEM's challenge, on the
other hand, alleged that the particular issues about which they wished
to speak were treated in a biased manner. In re BEM raised a more
basic challenge to the system: the implication of BEM's claim was
that only the speaker holding a viewpoint can adequately inform the
public about the viewpoint's importance and nuances, and that
79. See id. at 227 ("As Red Lion makes clear, the licensee is a fiduciary with
obligations to present views and voices which are representative of his community.").
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
81. Id. The majority reasoned that "the operator of a public park or transit system
has no such obligation; if the analogy offered by the dissent were valid, a broadcaster
would be free to present only one side of every public issue so long as he did not reject any
one who chose to speak. There would be no obligation to present the other side, let alone
the obligation imposed by [the Cullman doctrine] to put on an opposing view without
charge. It is clear, therefore, that the analogy to other types of facilities that carry speech
to the public, or furnish a place for speech, is fatally faulty." Id.
82. Id. at 225. Indeed, it was regarded as so important to stop the affluent from
dictating public debate that the FCC had a hard time believing that DNC would ever
suggest (which it didn't) that all discretionary prior restraints based on speaker identity or
viewpoint would be impermissible: "Presumably, the licensee would not have to turn over
all of its time on a first come, first served basis, for this would mean that the issues
discussed and the persons speaking would be governed entirely by money." Id. at 228.
83. See infra, Part III C.
licensees were constitutionally barred from exercising complete
control over how viewpoints were to be exposed to the public and
from determining by fiat how much exposure each viewpoint merited.
2. In re BEM
BEM conceded that WITOP had given significant treatment to
the issue of the Vietnam War, but charged, "although WTOP has
regularly presented the views of government officials and others
supporting the Administration's position, it has not devoted a
significant amount of time to contrasting views."'84 And to the extent
WTOP had provided opponents of the war a forum, "BEM advocates
views in contrast to those already broadcast.. .only by permitting
BEM to air its views can WTOP comply with the legislative policy
that it 'afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance."'85
The FCC first held that BEM failed to make a prima facie
showing that WTOP's coverage of the war exhibited bias. The FCC
then rejected BEM's distinct argument that the fairness doctrine had
been violated because WTOP refused to broadcast advertorials
regarding the war while allowing others to purchase time to broadcast
announcements "on such controversial subjects of public importance
as religion, the environment, the national economy, armed forces
recruiting and smoking."'8 The FCC reaffirmed its rule that the sale
of time to discuss some controversial topics but not others was
permissible because of the licensee's discretion "to determine the
format for presentation of controversial issues.,
87
The FCC's determination that the fairness doctrine had been
satisfied essentially ended the inquiry: because the fairness doctrine
served to unify the statutory, public policy, and First Amendment
inquiries," a licensee's discharge of its statutorily imposed obligation
to serve the public interest was accepted as furthering the only
relevant First Amendment interest (the public's right to receive
information). Thus, in response to the contention that the FCC itself
had committed a First Amendment violation (through inaction or
through policies infringing BEM's right to speak), the Commission
84. In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242,243 (1970).
85. Id. at 244 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
86. Id. at 246.
87. In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d. at 247.
88. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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simply repeated its interpretation of Red Lion: 9 as long as a
broadcaster complied with the fairness doctrine, the public interest
had been served, and therefore both the broadcaster and the
government were absolved from any further First Amendment
responsibilities.
The Commission nevertheless proceeded to address BEM's
claim that WTOP had violated the First Amendment "right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences" because it "frustrated the public's
right to hear the views of BEM."'9 This claim, rooted in the liberty
tradition, was rejected because since WTOP was not shown to have
violated the fairness doctrine, it had by definition "provided suitable
access to the public on the ideas which BEM wishes to express." 91 A
licensee possessed final discretion to decide "whether a subject is
worth considering, whether the viewpoint of the requesting party has
already received a sufficient amount of broadcast time, or whether
there may not be other available groups or individuals who might be
more appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of view."9 All
war opponents were deemed to express the same viewpoint, and
"because of the multiplicity of spokesmen available to express views
on the Vietnam war, it is obvious that a licensee must exercise its
judgment in choosing appropriate spokesmen to insure [sic] an
orderly and effective presentation of the many conflicting views." 93 It
is clear that this position was tenable only as long as the fairness
doctrine was enforced. The majorities in In re DNC and In re BEM
were able to reject Commissioner Johnson's attempt to apply public
forum precedents only because of the affirmative obligations of
broadcasters to air different points of view pertaining to controversial
issues. It can hardly be disputed that this argument is no longer
apposite due to the demise of the fairness doctrine.
C. Johnson's BEM Dissent and DNC before the Court of Appeals
Commissioner Johnson's vigorous dissent from In re BEM
argued the First Amendment applied to the actions of licensees
because they operated a forum for the expression of ideas.
89. In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d at 247.
90. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co, Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 244, 245.
93. Id. at 244.
94. 25 F.C.C. 2d at 269 (Johnson's In re DNC dissent provided mostly rhetorical
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Therefore advertorials could not be excluded absent "evidence that
acceptance of the advertisement would interfere with [the licensee's]
normal function of presenting advertising space to sponsors and
entertainment programming to listeners." 9  He concluded that the
petitions of both BEM and DNC should be granted because "the
principles and policies of the First Amendment... [dictate] that
licensees must accept some non-commercial advertising, and that the
amount accepted must be reasonable." 96  The Court of Appeals
adopted this limited conclusion, instructing the FCC to promulgate
regulations to ensure that licensees provided reasonable access to
individuals wishing to broadcast political speech. A brief exploration
of the Court of Appeals' liberty tradition reasoning illuminates the
incompatibility of broadcasters' restraints with current First
Amendment doctrine?
The Court of Appeals not only granted DNC's request for a
declaratory judgment regarding the right to public comment,98 they
essentially adopted the liberty tradition's reasoning upon which
BEM's challenge rested; even if a licensee scrupulously fulfilled its
obligations under the fairness doctrine, 99 a policy excluding
advertorials was impermissible because it was inconsistent with
individuals' First Amendment right of self-expression.
The Court of Appeals looked to Red Lion, which they believed
constituted a "clarion call for a new public concern and activism
regarding the broadcast media" because it subordinated the First
Amendment interests of individual broadcasters to the
"constitutional rights of the general public."1°° The Court refused to
adopt the FCC's premise that the public's only interest was "as
flourish, relying on and explicitly citing his In re BEM dissent for the reasoning and
precedents in support of his position).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 274.
97. The Court relied exclusively and explicitly First Amendment considerations,
concluding that "the constitutional question must be faced and is, indeed, essence of these
cases. Whether our decision is styled as a 'First Amendment decision' or as a decision
interpreting the fairness and public interest requirements 'in light of the First
Amendment' matters little." Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d
642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98. DNC's request for a declaratory judgment regarding he right to solicit funds was
not appealed due to the networks' concessions discussed above.
99. The FCC's conclusion that WTOP had not violated the fairness doctrine was not
appealed.
100. 450 F.2d at 650.
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viewers and listeners-not as speakers.''. They admonished the FCC
for reading "the Red Lion Court's mention of 'the right of the public
to receive suitable access to.. .ideas and experiences"' "to set forth
not only an interest of the public, but the only interest of the
public."'0 2 In no other context had the Supreme Court made "the goal
of an informed public the exclusive First Amendment interest
constraining broadcasters."1"3  The First Amendment's "concern
extends beyond the mere fostering of speech whose content will
properly inform the public," in part because of the "interest of
individuals and groups in effective self expression ... [w]e all have an
interest in speaking up ourselves as well as in hearing others."'
04
The liberty tradition momentarily triumphed. The public
interest was best served by advertorials because "the individual or
group holding the viewpoint" was in the best position to convey the
nuances of a viewpoint and to judge its importance.' 5 Nor was the
liberty tradition's victory marred by interference with broadcasters'
rights. Since the only contest was over "time relinquished by
broadcasters to others.. .[t]heir speech is not at issue; rather, all that is
at issue is their decision as to which other parties will be given an
opportunity to speak."' '
The Court declared discrimination between "commercial" and
"controversial" speech impermissible based on a brief litany of cases
now frequently cited as the early public forum canon."' The Court's
conclusion anticipated doctrine not made explicit until 1992's
101. Id. at 654.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 450 F.2d at 655.
104. Id. at 656.
105. Id. ("[A] paid advertisement is basically controlled and edited by the advertiser.
He is allowed to present his views in a fashion chosen by himself.. .when an individual or
group buys time to say its piece, the crucial controls are in its own hands. Editorial
advertising is thus a special and separate mode of expression, not simply a duplication of
other expression on the same medium.").
106. Id. at 650 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that the decision had no impact
on broadcasters who accepted no advertisements at all, it only impacted those who had
offered blocks of time for purchase by the public and then excluded some members of the
public based on the content of their speech. "For the issue in these cases is the
permissibility of discrimination, within a given block of advertising time, against
'controversial' speech and in favor of commercial and 'noncontroversial' speech." Id. at
659.
107. Id. at 659-62 (citing, inter alia, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966)).
ISKCON:
By opening up a forum for some paid
presentations, independently edited and controlled by
members of the public, the broadcasters have waived
any argument that advertising is inherently disruptive
of the proper function of their stations. The exclusion
of only one sort of advertising ... is then highly
suspect, a prima facie constitutional violation. To
justify the exclusion, there must be a substantial factor
distinguishing the disruptive effect of editorial
advertising from that of commercial advertising.'08
This is the high-water mark of the opinion. In stirring tones the
Court established that even a content-neutral ban on "controversial"
advertisements was unjustifiable,"9 poor policy,1 and opened the
door to viewpoint-based discrimination among controversial ideas."
Unfortunately, the Court quickly lost touch with the liberty tradition,
and the force of their arguments dissipated in a scattered attempt to
compromise with the FCC's desire to moderate the social debate.
The Court instructed the FCC to develop a scheme of reasonable
regulation to enforce their holding that "editorial advertisements
should at least be considered and that some should be aired.",112 This
narrow holding doubtless appeared attractive because it mandated
only "a modest reform" that did not "substantially undermine
broadcasters' editorial control over their frequencies.,"" But the
"reasonable" regulations suggested by the Court demonstrate their
failure to follow their liberty tradition leanings. If individuals had a
First Amendment right to purchase advertising time, how could an
individual be turned away simply because someone else with a similar
viewpoint had already been granted time? Cantwell tells us that First
108. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 450 F.2d at 660.
109. Id. ("The content of the idea which the excluded speakers seek to promote is-
emphatically-not permitted as a distinguishing factor in itself.") (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 661 ("No doubt a discrimination against all controversial speech ... is
somewhat less 'odious' than a discrimination among different controversial viewpoints on
particular issues. But it is a form of censorship all the same. It is a favoritism toward the
status quo and public apathy and, in these cases, a favoritism toward bland
commercialism.").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 663.
113. Id.
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Amendment rights inhere in individuals, not in cohorts of people who
share political sympathies or any other characteristic.'1 4 In addition,
the financial burdens broadcasters would face due to the Cullman
doctrine were cited by the Court to support a limit on the total
amount of controversial advertising. This, despite the Court's
conclusion that discrimination between commercial advertising and
noncommercial 'controversial' advertising was impermissible absent a
demonstrated difference in impact on the forum. If the Court really
believed that advertising time represented a public forum rather than
broadcasters' speech, why didn't they declare the Cullman doctrine
unconstitutional because of the constraints it indirectly placed on
individuals' ability to access the forum?
Perhaps the Court of Appeals followed the same (largely
unarticulated) reasoning that can be detected in the Supreme Court's
opinion in CBS v. DNC. Since the FCC was affirmatively acting to
ensure that at least some set of First Amendment values were being
served by the broadcasters, the FCC was free to balance the
competing First Amendment claims at stake. This compromise is not
incoherent given the Appellate Court's view of Red Lion; that it
merely required some weight to be given to individuals' interest in
self-expression-on this view there is no reason the public's right to
receive information could not be 'balanced' against it.
Ultimately the Court of Appeals' holding is of little relevance
because it was reversed by the Supreme Court, but it illustrates how
the presence of regulatory controls provided the basis for the political
tradition's ascendancy at that period of time. Furthermore, the
invocation of the liberty tradition illuminates the most striking of the
inadequacies that pervade CBS v. DNC-the Supreme Court's failure
to adopt a clear position on the importance of the individual right to
voice one's views. The Supreme Court placed the right of the public to
be informed atop the hierarchy of constitutional values (in part because
of inappropriate deference to the FCC made possible by the then-
current regulatory regime), but never unequivocally elucidated the
position in that hierarchy allotted to the individual's right to speak.
D. The Irrelevance of CBS v. DNC: The Fairness Doctrine Justifies
Suppressing the Speech of Some to Enhance the Relative Voice of
Others
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, driven by
two conclusions. Most importantly, because of the fairness doctrine,
114. See POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 22.
broadcasters were not obligated to treat commercial and
noncommercial advertisements in a content-neutral manner. Five
Justices115 rejected the Court of Appeals' attempt to introduce public
forum cases; these cases' 6 were inapplicable to broadcasting because
"in none of those cases did the forum sought for expression have an
affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide full and
fair coverage of public issues.""' 7 In the view of the Court, the
existence (and assumed enforcement) of the fairness doctrine meant
that no discrimination against controversial speech was possible in
broadcasting, "[t]he question here is not whether there is to be
discussion of controversial issues of public importance on the
broadcast media, but rather who shall determine what issues are to be
discussed by whom, and when.""..8 Only the political tradition treats
as acceptable the idea that the state may act as the parliamentarian at
a town meeting-determining the issues on the public agenda, how
they will be discussed, and who shall have a say. The Supreme
Court's opinion, however, does not resolve whether they meant this
rejection of the liberty tradition to be significant, or whether this
result was an incidental byproduct of another fundamental choice;
their implicit decision that the regulatory regime then in place
allowed them to defer to legislative and administrative interpretations
of the First Amendment.
1. The Fractured CBS v. DNC Opinion
Chief Justice Burger wrote for six justices " 9 in Parts I and II,
discussing the Communications Act 2° and the fairness doctrine, and
setting the tone of the opinion by declaring that a First Amendment
115. This conclusion was reached in part IV of the Court's opinion, and was therefore
accepted by Burger, Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and Powell. See infra, Section D.1
(discussing the fractured opinion).
116. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 129 (1973) (The Supreme Court added to the litany
offered by the Court of Appeals Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) and
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
119. Justices White, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stewart joined parts I and II.
120. Part II emphasized § 3(h), which provided that radio broadcasters would not be
deemed common carriers. The Court unfortunately failed to note, as Commissioner
Johnson did, that a literal interpretation of §3(h) would be inconsistent with the implicitly
accepted equal time provisions of § 3(a). See Commissioner Johnson's In re BEM dissent,
25 F.C.C.2d 242, 251-52. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2004) ("If any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office.").
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review could only occur "within the framework of the regulatory
scheme developed over the past half century," and that "great
weight" should be afforded "to the decision of Congress and the
experience of the Commission.' 12' He wrote the heart of the
opinion-Part IV-for himself and four other Justices, concluding
that assuming government action existed, the First Amendment had
not been violated.22
Despite the protest of the dissenters (who saliently noted that no
majority had decided whether or not state action was present 23), Part
IV represents the only point of majority agreement on an actual
holding, and therefore only from Part IV can be gleaned whatever
meaning CBS v. DNC has today. Part IV's reliance on the since-
abrogated fairness doctrine has already been noted. (Justice White's
concurrence emphasized that the only question the Court decided
was that "broadcaster freedom and discretion... to choose their
121. CBS, 412 U.S. at 102.
122. He was joined in this conclusion by White, Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist
(note the absence of Justice Stewart). Since they concurred in this portion of the opinion,
White, Powell, and Blackmun all declined to reach the question of whether government
action was present. CBS, 412 U.S. at 147 (White, J., concurring); id. at 148 (Blackmun, J.
for himself and Powell, J., concurring). Stewart did not join Part IV because he joined
Rehnquist and Burger in Part III of Burger's opinion, which concluded no state action was
present because "the Commission has not fostered the licensee policy challenged here,"
the government was not a "partner" of the licensee, and the government was not engaged
in a "symbiotic relationship" with the licensee that allowed the State to profit from a
private actor's discrimination. Id. at 118-20 (Burger, C.J. for himself and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). These three Justices thus rejected the Court of Appeals' grounds for finding
state action and distinguished Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1972)
(holding that government action was present when a D.C. bus company installed radio
receivers in public buses because "Congress had expressly authorized the agency to
undertake plenary intervention into the affairs of the carrier and it was pursuant to that
authorization that the agency investigated the challenged policy and approved it on public
interest standards."). See CBS, 412 U.S. at 119; Pollak 343 U.S. at 462; Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that the racial discrimination
of a private diner located within a public parking garage was impermissible state action
because the State profited from the diner's invidious discrimination).
Justice Douglas also refused to find state action; he failed to join Part III, but believed no
state action could be possibly be present because of his absolutist position that "[t]he
Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime." CBS, 412 U.S. at 154
(Douglas, J., concurring in judgment). Douglas disagreed with Red Lion's approval of the
fairness doctrine (he did not participate in the consideration of Red Lion) and believed
that the FCC had no authority to regulate broadcasters because "TV and radio stand in
the same protected position under the First Amendment as do newspapers and
magazines." Id. at 148. Justice Stewart's separate concurrence noted that although he
joined part III of the Burger Opinion, his "views closely approach those expressed by Mr.
Justice Douglas." Id. at 132 (Stewart, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 172.
method of compliance with the Fairness Doctrine is consistent with the
First Amendment." '124) Section D 2 attempts to bring the importance
of the fairness doctrine into sharper relief by arguing that in its
absence the Court's deference to the FCC is indefensible. However,
Part IV of the Court's opinion contains two important conclusions
that survive the demise of the fairness doctrine. Section D 3 argues
that CBS v. DNC recognized that individual rights have some place in
the hierarchy of First Amendment values at issue in the broadcasting
context, and Section D 4 makes the case that CBS v. DNC established
that broadcasters' editorial discretion is not implicated by the airing
of paid-for advertorials.
2. The Court's Failure to Independently Construe the First Amendment
The Court adopted a muddled approach to the intertwining
statutory-public policy-constitutional considerations, declining to
imitate the Court of Appeals and reach for the First Amendment to
find extrinsic guidance. They instead sought "compelling indications
of error" on the part of the FCC by examining whether the
Commission's conclusions served the public interest as envisioned by
Congress.125 The decision to assess administrative action based on
compatibility with Congressional policies rather than consistency with
the Court's own view of the First Amendment constituted
monumental judicial deference considering "those [Congressional]
policies ... were drawn from the First Amendment itself., 126
Regardless of the propriety of the Court's deference to Congress'
interpretation of the First Amendment interests at stake, their
reluctance to overturn the Commission is striking considering that
Congress had chosen to balance various groups' interests in access by
leaving "such questions with the Commission. '
Thus Congress was given latitude in crafting policies consistent
with the First Amendment's guarantees-even when the sole
command of Congress was that the FCC should make a decision. In
this roundabout manner the Supreme Court adopted the FCC
majority's interpretation of the constitutional interests at stake.128
124. Id. at 147 (White, J., concurring).
125. CBS, 412 U.S. at 122 ("by a careful evaluation of the Commission's reasoning in
light of the policies embodied by Congress in the 'public interest' standard of the Act.").
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 103 (The Court's deferential standard of review ("compelling indications of
error on the part of the Commission") belied their protest: "That is not to say that we
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The Court believed that Congressional inaction indicated that "First
Amendment principles" did not call for an individual right to
purchase advertising time-Congress had "time and again rejected
various legislative attempts that would have mandated a variety of
forms of individual access."'2 9 But if the Commission had decided to
grant an individual right of access, that would have been fine too:
"Congress' rejection of such proposals [for private access] must [not]
be taken to mean that Congress is opposed to private rights of access
under all circumstances. Rather, the point is that Congress has
chosen to leave such questions with the Commission.""'
Such an approach could be construed as justified deference to an
administrative agency granted "the flexibility to experiment with new
ideas as changing conditions require."'' But the Court's acceptance
of the priorities set by the legislature and the FCC resulted in a
failure to examine whether the laws underlying the broadcasting
system abridged freedom of speech-a staggering abdication of the
Court's responsibility to say what the Constitution means and
whether Congress has exceeded the limits imposed upon it by the
First Amendment. "2 While some deference to the FCC was perhaps
appropriate because the fairness doctrine at least gave the FCC the
mission and the power to prevent wholesale viewpoint discrimination,
the discretion given to the FCC is remarkable considering the
constitutional gravity of the issues on which the Supreme Court
determined that the "Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to
the Commission's judgment.""'
The Supreme Court rebuked the Court of Appeals for its failure
to recognize that Congress and the Commission were better able than
the judiciary to decide in what manner to ensure that "debate on
public issues should be 'robust and wide-open"'-whether the nation
"should exchange 'public trustee' broadcasting, with all its limitations,
for a system of self-appointed editorial commentators.""4
Furthermore, the Commission was "also entitled to take into account
'defer' to the judgment of the Congress and the Commission on a constitutional question,
or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we determine that the
Commission has not fulfilled its task with appropriate sensitivity to the interests in free
expression.").
129. Id. at 122.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
133. CBS, 412 U.S. at 123.
134. Id. at 125 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
that.., listeners and viewers constitute a 'captive audience."' 135 The
Court's assertion that the Commission was best able to consider the
First Amendment implications of the "captivity" of television viewers
is somewhat incongruous, considering the sole support was provided
by two easily distinguishable cases (Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak36 and Kovacs v. Cooper37), one of which explicitly noted that
distinct First Amendment standards must be developed for each
medium of communication-presumably by the judiciary.138  The
Pacifica rationales of accessibility to children and pervasiveness might
provide related grounds to support concern for captive audiences
today, but the doctrinal strength of the FCC's concern is beside the
point. Allowing the FCC rather than the judiciary to determine how
best to regulate a medium to provide appropriate protection for free
expression allowed the FCC to make a fundamental First
Amendment choice regarding whether or not "because we tolerate
pervasive commercial advertisements we can also live with its political
counterparts [sic].' 39
Finally, the Court criticized the "constitutionally commanded
and Government supervised right-of-access system.. .mandated by
the Court of Appeals" because "the Commission would be required
to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters'
conduct."' ° And if the fairness doctrine and the Cullman doctrine
"were suspended to alleviate these problems, as [DNC and BEM
suggested] might be appropriate, the question arises whether we
would have abandoned more than we have gained.' ' 14' Apparently the
Commission was in the better position to answer that question, and
the Court of Appeals should have deferred to the FCC on so weighty
a matter as the level of government oversight demanded to resolve
competing First Amendment claims. This particular conclusion has
135. Id. at 127. Captive audiences have always received greater solicitude. See infra,
notes 198-200.
136. 343 U.S. 451 (1972) (dealing with radio receivers in public buses).
137. 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (dealing with sound trucks in residential areas).
138. Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I do not agree that, if we sustain regulations
or prohibitions of sound trucks, they must therefore be valid if applied to other methods of
'communication of ideas.' The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the
handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values,
abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself, and all we are dealing with now
is the sound truck.").
139. CBS, 412 U.S. at 128. See also, In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 (concurring opinion
of Commissioner Cox).
140. CBS, 412 U.S. at 126-27.
141. Id. at 124.
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intuitive appeal to civil libertarians because the Court demanded less
state involvement, but the implication is troubling. Allowing an
administrative agency to determine how much power it must possess
to carry out its mandate is inconsistent with the idea that our
government has limited powers and is constrained by the
constitutional rights of individuals. The impropriety of allowing an
agency to determine the scope of its own mandate is particularly
apparent when the agency's function is to ensure freedom of
expression.
This remarkable deference to an administrative agency's
interpretation of a fundamental constitutional mandate rested on the
existence of the fairness doctrine, and the Court cannot abstain from
making such fundamental choices about the structure of the public
communicative sphere in its absence. The political tradition approach
was deemed appealing in 1973, but today the FCC simply lacks the
tools to moderate the "town meeting."
3. The Rights of Individuals Have Some Place in the Inquiry
On the other hand, it is possible that the Court actually did not
defer to the FCC, but merely approved the FCC's interpretation of
the First Amendment interest at stake because it was identical to the
Court's. This interpretation is difficult to defend, however, because
although the Court avoided explicitly resolving the conflict between
the FCC's interpretation42 of Red Lion and that offered by the Court
of Appeals,43 the Court both explicitly and implicitly indicated that
the Court of Appeals was correct that individuals' right to access the
broadcasting frequency must be taken into account. The Court
framed the question presented as:
Whether the various interests in free expression of the
public, the broadcaster, and the individuals require
broadcasters to sell commercial time to persons
wishing to discuss controversial issues. In resolving
that issue it must constantly be kept in mind that the
interest of the public is our foremost concern. With
broadcasting, where the available means of
communication are limited in both space and time, the
admonition of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn that
142. The public's only interest was in the passive receipt of information.
143. The public's interest in suitable access to ideas was an interest to be considered,
but not the sole First Amendment concern involved.
"what is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
that everything worth saying shall be said" is
peculiarly appropriate."
The FCC repeatedly emphasized that Red Lion established the
right of the public to hear different points of view, rather than
creating a "right of a particular spokesman to obtain access to the
air, '.4 and the Court implicitly approved this interpretation of Red
Lion by invoking Meiklejohn. But the Court also stated that
individual rights had some place in the inquiry (even if not the place
of foremost concern). What weight, then, was to be given to the
individual right to participate in public debate, to speak for one's self
and control one's own message?
The Court's opening salvo against the Court of Appeals is
indicative of the many missed opportunities to explicitly answer this
question. After noting that "the Commission has decided that on
balance the undesirable effects of the right of access urged by
respondents would outweigh the asserted benefits,"' 6 the Supreme
Court echoed the FCC's concern over the effect of wealth on public
debate in the absence of broadcaster discretion to reject controversial
advertisements. "The Commission was justified in concluding that
the public interest in providing access to the marketplace of 'ideas
and experiences' would scarcely be served by a system so heavily
weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to
wealth.' '47 So the public interest is served by 'providing access to the
marketplace.' But what sort of access? Is the public interest served
when the public is provided access to the marketplace solely for the
purpose of consuming ideas? Or are individuals to be provided
access to the marketplace so they can offer their ideas for
consumption?
Possibly the meaning of "providing access to the marketplace" is
left indeterminate merely due to the inadvertent appendage of the
popular "marketplace of ideas" metaphor onto an unrelated quote,
and the questions the phrase generates are meant to be answered by
the Court's invocation of Red Lion's famous admonition that the
public has an interest in suitable access to ideas (not to a
144. CBS, 412 U.S. at 122 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
26 (1948)) (emphasis added).
145. In re BEM, 25 F.C.C. 2d at 247. See also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, 394 (1969).
146. CBS, 412 U.S. at 122.
147. Id. at 123.
Winter & Spring 20061 NO MODERATOR NEEDED
286 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 33:2&3
marketplace) for the purpose of receiving the ideas. But the Court
apparently believed something quite different; they argued that the
Court of Appeals' solution was a bad one because impecunious
individuals would not have a sufficient opportunity to speak in the
marketplace if the system were dominated by wealth. "Thus, the very
premise of the Court of Appeals' holding-that a right of access is
necessary to allow individuals and groups the opportunity for self-
initiated speech-would have very little meaning to those who could
not afford to purchase time in the first instance."' "8 Does that mean
that if the individual right the Court of Appeals sought to further had
very much meaning to everyone, the Commission would have been
unjustified in deciding that the undesirable effects of a right of access
'outweighed' the asserted benefits? Probably not, given the broad
latitude the Court granted to the FCC, but the Court's discussion of
individuals' ability to speak in the marketplace demonstrates that an
appropriate consideration of broadcasting regulations must include
the impact that regulations would have on the relative ability of less
affluent individuals to "access the marketplace" of ideas offer their
ideas for consumption. Thus, the Court's reference to 'access to the
marketplace' was intentional, and the Court of Appeals was correct in
refusing to view the public's access to ideas as the sole aim of the First
Amendment in the broadcasting context.
The Supreme Court therefore accepted the Court of Appeals'
argument that the interest of the individual in offering ideas into the
marketplace at least should be considered, but concluded that it was
subordinate to the right of the public to be informed in part because
the wealthy might use their wealth to engage in controversial political
speech. Thus the Court explicitly approved a regulatory regime on
the now-indefensible grounds that it served the public interest to
"restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others."'' 9 It can be argued that the
voice of some was not restricted for the purpose of enhancing the
voice of others, but to ensure that some voices did not have excessive
influence on the public, but this is clearly disingenuous: by preventing
some voices from having an 'excessive influence', the relative voices
of others are necessarily enhanced. In any event, surely the political
tradition bears the heavy burden of justifying the suppression of the
148. Id.
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
speech of some individuals merely because they are wealthier than
others who hold a competing 'controversial' view.
4. The Scope of Broadcasters' Discretion Does Not Reach Time Sold for
Advertisements
The Supreme Court failed to explicitly address the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that broadcasters' editorial discretion was not
implicated in the allocation of advertising time. A close reading of
the opinion, however, demonstrates that the majority accepted the
Court of Appeals' intuitively appealing argument. The Supreme
Court lacked the Court of Appeals' implicit faith in the FCC's ability
to promulgate reasonable regulations that would prevent real
financial damage to broadcasters: the Cullman doctrine clearly would
have forced broadcasters to grant at least some free advertising time,
and the Supreme Court feared that in order to "minimize financial
hardship and to comply fully with its public responsibilities a
broadcaster might well be forced to make regular programming time
available to those holding a view different from that expressed in an
editorial advertisements.' 5 ° Thus, the Cullman doctrine could lead to
"a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the
treatment of public issues." ' It is significant that this is the only
situation in which the Supreme Court mentioned the impact of the
Court of Appeals' holding on the editorial discretion of broadcasters.
The Supreme Court noticeably did not say that the act of
broadcasting an unwanted advertisement (or providing free
advertising time to an opponent of an advertorial) implicated a
broadcasters' editorial discretion. It was only the provision of regular
programming time that implicated editorial discretion.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court also used language that muddied
the issue.
The Court rejected the contention that "every potential speaker
is the best judge of what the listening public ought to hear.. .all
journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary. For better or
worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material."'52 Given the juxtaposition of potential speakers'
claims and 'selection and choice of material', at first blush this sounds
as if 'editing' is what broadcasters do when they select between
advertisements. But the Court never said this. There was no mention
150. CBS, 412 U.S. at 124.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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that denying a broadcaster the freedom to select between advertorials
in any sense implicated the broadcasters' First Amendment interests.
The broadcasters' right to edit played a role in the Supreme Court's
calculus, but only with respect to regular programming-and
broadcasters' collective role as meta-editors was important primarily
because it provided the best means of informing the public.
This is made more clear if the reason the Court made this famous
statement is understood. "Editing is what editors are for" was a
response to a portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that attacked
not broadcasters' decisions regarding the allotment of advertising
time, but broadcasters' retention of control over what the public
would hear. The Court of Appeals asserted that in order to inform
the public, "supervised and ordained discussion is not enough." '53
The Supreme Court simply disagreed as to the best way to provide
informative debate to the public.' Broadcasters were empowered to
reject advertorials not because of any impact on broadcasters'
editorial discretion, but only because the public's right to receive
balanced information was superior to individuals' rights to offer their
ideas for consumption, and a moderator or meta-editor was assumed
to be required to enlighten the public. It is clear that the Supreme
Court rejected the Court of Appeals' holding not due to concern over
the editorial discretion of broadcasters (which was not even
mentioned with respect to advertorials), but because an individual
right to purchase advertorials might misinform the public because it
"would serve to transfer a large share of responsibility for balanced
broadcasting from an identifiable, regulated entity-the licensee-to
unregulated speakers who could afford the cost."'55 The Court made
this most explicit when they decried
the risk of an enlargement of Government control over
the content of broadcast discussion of public issues. This
risk is inherent in the Court of Appeals' remand
requiring regulations and procedures to sort out requests
to be heard-a process that involves the very editing that
153. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 450 F.2d at 656 (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). Id. at 657 ("Assuming that
broadcasters are sometimes fallible, the goal of a fully informed public is best attained by
[the] opening of outlets for members of the public to supplement the licensees'
assessments of 'importance,' 'controversiality' and 'full' coverage.").
154. CBS, 412 U.S. at 125 ("To agree that debate on public issues should be robust and
wide-open does not mean that we should exchange public trustee broadcasting, with all its
limitations, for a system of self-appointed editorial commentators.").
155. Id. at 130.
licensees now perform as to regular programming.156
This is the key passage-editing is only performed by licensees as
to regular programming. The state was not risking involvement with
broadcasters' discussion of public issues-'broadcast' is an adjective
here, it's not a possessive noun. Advertorials carried by a frequency
constitute 'broadcast discussion of public issues.' But they are not
broadcasters' discussion of public issues.
Three of the Court's arguments demonstrate that the Court
concluded broadcasting an unwanted advertorial did not infringe on
editorial discretion. First, the Court conceded that advertising time is
a public forum of some sort; the public forum cases cited by the Court
of Appeals were rejected not because the "forum" analogy was faulty,
but because "in none of those cases did the forum sought for
expression" operate within the confines of the fairness doctrine.157
Second, the Court cited the possibility of "erosion of journalistic
discretion" only in the sense that the Cullman doctrine might force
broadcasters to "make regular programming time available to those
holding a view different from that expressed in an editorial
advertisements.' '15 8  Third, the Court explicitly stated that
broadcasters perform "editing with respect to regular programming,"
as opposed to the entirety of their frequency (which would include
advertisements).'59
It is important to note that the Court accepted the proposition that
a broadcasters' editorial discretion is not implicated by the transmission
of an advertorial because if broadcasters' First Amendment rights are
not implicated, the application of the liberty tradition can proceed
without an unseemly attempt to balance the interests of broadcasters
and those seeking access. Unfortunately, the Court's treatment of the
issue may not be sufficiently explicit to allow CBS v. DNC to provide
compelling precedent. Section IV will assume that the question was
not definitively answered in 1973, and will attempt to resolve the issue
by exploring the manner in which physical fora have been subdivided,
the scope given to editorial discretion in other communicative contexts,
and the social meaning that provides the implicit basis on which the
Court now resolves whether or not a message is properly viewed as the
'speech' of someone in particular.
156. Id. at 126 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. at 129.
158. Id. at 124.
159. Id. at 126.
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IV. Speech Consistent With the Actual Use of a Forum Cannot
be Excluded on the Basis of Viewpoint
Commissioner Johnson and the Court of Appeals reasoned that
if some subsection of the broadcasting spectrum constituted a public
forum, content-based exclusions from that portion of a frequency
were impermissible. This Section will reveal that their conclusion is
persuasive today, although somewhat different terminology is
required due to the Court's refinement of public forum doctrine since
1973. The cases on which the Court of Appeals relied have been
questioned and are no longer patently controlling, but they remain
consistent with modern doctrine in one key respect; a discrete forum
located on public property is subject to the First Amendment when it
is conducive to a third party's speech, including advertising.
A. Speech on Public Property Can be Restricted Only to Preserve The
Property's Use
Modern public forum doctrine analyzes restrictions on speech in
various social settings based on the type of forum at issue and the
purpose of the regulation." Doctrine reveals three types of fora:
traditional public fora, limited purpose public fora, and nonpublic
fora. Parcels of property traditionally used by the public for First
Amendment purposes (streets, parks, and sidewalks'61), and locations
expressly designated as appropriate for unfettered speech activity
("designated public fora" 62), qualify as traditional public fora, and
160. Courts routinely rest their assessment of a restriction's constitutionality on the
perceived legislative motive, notwithstanding the possibly disingenuous tendency of some
Justices to invoke periodically the "familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court
will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive," United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968), quoted in Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994) and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986). See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994)
("We ... look to the government's purpose as the threshold consideration.... [T]he fact
that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the
injunction content or viewpoint based."); Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986);
Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
161. The property may be privately or publicly owned. The Court holds true to the
Hague formulation that property may be a public forum, "[wiherever the title of streets
and parks may rest ... " Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.,
concurring). The ownership of a forum can determine the reasonableness of a restriction,
however. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("The residential character
of those streets may well inform the application of the relevant test..."); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455,460-61 (1980).
162. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985);
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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speech cannot be restricted based on its content absent a compelling
state interest.16' A limited purpose public forum exists when the
government expressly dedicates a location for speech but places
restrictions on speaker identity" or permissible subject matter.
Public property not conducive to unfettered speech activity
constitutes a nonpublic forum in which no speaker presumptively has
a right to speak. The government may select between speakers, and
may even exclude all speakers (declare the forum entirely
inconsistent with speech activity), but even in a nonpublic forum the
state cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination.' 66 "The government
can restrict access to a nonpublic forum 'as long as the restrictions are
reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."" 67  As Justice
O'Connor's ISKCON opinion established in 1992 and as the Circuits
have recognized, the intended purpose of the property determines
whether it qualifies as a designated public forum, but the actual use of
a property rather than its asserted purpose determines the
reasonableness of speech restrictions in both designated and
nonpublic fora.'6
163. Attempts to exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum are subject to strict
scrutiny, and are permissible "only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest." Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 800. Some restrictions are termed "content-neutral" even when they select
between speech based on content if the regulations were adopted for a legitimate reason
other than objection to the content of the speech or the viewpoint of the speaker. See
infra, notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
165. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993).
166. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 ("although a speaker may be excluded from a
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the
forum... or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the
forum was created... , the government violates the First Amendment when it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject.").
167. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 667-68 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
168. Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[In
ISKCON] the Court also found the ban on leafleting unreasonable given the multipurpose
nature of the airports and the evidence in the record.... In actuality, this constitutes only
Justice O'Connor's view... but as the narrowest majority holding, we are bound by it.")
(internal citations omitted); Chicago ACORN, SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metro. Pier &
Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir., 1998) ("while holding that the airport was
not a traditional public forum, the [ISKCON] Court also held that the Krishnas were
entitled to hand out leaflets in the public areas of the airport .... Actually, this was only
Justice O'Connor's view; but it is the lowest common denominator of the Court's
fractured decisions ... and is therefore the holding that binds us."); see also New England
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1. Subdividing a Forum
Each commercial broadcasting frequency has been leased to a
private actor empowered to exercise discretion over the content of
their speech that is transmitted over that bandwidth, but a distinction
can easily be made between a network's programming and time
opened for advertisements based on precedent clearly holding that a
forum can be subdivided into those portions that have been offered to
the public and those that have remained nonpublic.
The rights of those seeking to exercise First Amendment
freedoms depend on the characteristics of the discrete locus to which
they seek access, rather than the characteristics of the surrounding
property. This principle has been extended to advertising numerous
times,169 perhaps most illustratively by the Seventh Circuit in Air Line
Pilots Association, International v. City of Chicago.7 °  In Air Line
Pilots the City excluded from advertising dioramas at O'Hare Airport
a union's display critical of United Air Lines (the City objected to the
display's "political" rather than commercial character). The Seventh
Circuit reversed the District Court, which "defined the relevant
forum as the O'Hare concourse itself. This was error because 'the
forum should be defined in terms of the access sought by the
Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2002); East Timor Action
Network v. City of New York, 71 F. Supp.2d 334, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Christ's Bride
Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir. 1998); Multimedia Publ'g Co. v.
Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1993); United Food
& Commercial Workers Union v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 358
(6th Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit has paid lip service to Justice O'Connor's approach,
but (according to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits) has sometimes misapplied her criteria by
looking to the government's intended "primary purpose" of the property in assessing the
reasonableness of a restriction, rather than the compatibility of expressive activities with a
property's actual uses. See ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting disagreement with Second Circuit). Compare Hotel Employees & Rest.
Employees Union v. City of New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that speech activities in plaza outside Lincoln Center could be limited to
those with artistic purposes) with First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City, 308 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that restricting activities to limit uses to those consistent with
intended use-'ecclesiastical park'-was unconstitutional because the actual use of the
area was pedestrian thoroughfare).
169. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (dissenting
opinion); New York Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 1998);
Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2nd Cir. 1995); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985); Aids Action Comm. of
Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79 (D. Mass. 1993);
Lebron v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 242 U.S. App. D.C. 215 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 797 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 96 (1986).
170. 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
NO MODERATOR NEEDED
speaker. ' "1 7' "If a speaker seeks ... limited access, then we must
tailor our approach to ascertain 'the perimeters of a forum within the
confines of government property."
'1
2
After limiting the forum in question to the diorama display case,
the Air Line Pilots Court held that the status of the forum was
determined not by the asserted use (commercial advertising),'173 but by
"policy and practice of the government with respect to the underlying
property" and "the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity.', 71 Justice O'Connor's ISKCON opinion controls
the analysis; even if past practice reveals the forum is limited purpose
or nonpublic in nature, a speech restriction would still be
unreasonable unless the State could present a reason that the display
would "actually interfere" with the use to which the forum historically
has been put.'75
Air Line Pilots reflects the approach to advertising that the
Circuits have adopted in response to O'Connor's ISKCON opinion;
viewpoint-based discriminations are impermissible in a nonpublic
forum but content-based distinctions are permissible if they are
reasonable in light of the actual use to which a forum historically has
been put. If a forum's manager claims that an advertising venue is a
forum in which a content-based distinction has historically been made
between commercial and non-commercial advertisements, courts
conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into past practice.'76 If all non-
commercial advertisements have in fact always been excluded, then
the continued exclusion of non-commercial advertisements is a
content-based exclusion that may be reasonable-if the forum
manager can present a plausible reason that noncommercial
171. Id. at 1151 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1152.
174. Id. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03.
175. Id. at 1159-60 (citing Multimedia Publ'g Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)).
176. Compare Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(limiting forum analysis to the one particular billboard to which the artist sought access-
"The Spectacular"-and concluding that past practice revealed the exclusion of a political
advertisement was reasonable and viewpoint neutral) with New York Magazine v. Metro.
Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 1998) (granting injunction in favor of advertiser who
sought to post a commercial advertisement with political overtones because political
speech had been allowed in the past in advertising space on Transit Authority buses,
therefore the exclusion of an ad interpreted as insulting to Mayor Giuliani was an
unconstitutional prior restraint).
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advertising would interfere with the forum's actual use. 7 7
It is certainly questionable to assert that the display of a
"noncommercial" billboard will disrupt a forum in which
"commercial" placards have historically been displayed. Judge
Flaum's concurrence in Air Line Pilots may have presented the best
of the argument: "when a space is open to advertising, to commercial
speech, that fact indicates that the space is not only not disrupted by
expressive activity but is conducive to such activity."'1 7 The resolution
of this question is not necessary in order to construct a right of access
to broadcast advertisements, however, because broadcasters
frequently sell advertising time for noncommercial "public service"
announcements and political messages. Furthermore, networks will
sell time to large corporations who wish to transmit purportedly
noncommercial messages-anyone who watched television in the
aftermath of 9/11 can attest that the airwaves abounded with
heartwarming messages that did not explicitly propose a commercial
transaction: "'United We Stand,' sponsored by [buy] BigCorp, Inc."
Thus, advertising slots are not exclusively reserved for the
presentation of product solicitations, and mechanically applying the
Air Line Pilots approach to broadcasting time produces the following
result: the exclusion of an advertorial solely because it deals with a
noncommercial topic is unconstitutional because it is unreasonable in
light of the past practice of the forum administrator.
Such a limited approach is convenient, but it concedes that a
content-based distinction can permissibly be made between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" speech, and that there might
sometimes exist a defensible basis on which to discriminate among
the two in favor of commercial speech. Part B thus addresses another
still-compelling insight of the D.C. Circuit in the early 1970s; a
putatively content-based distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech is impermissible when the distinction is used
to exclude noncommercial speech.
177. See Lebron, 69 F.3d 650. The idea that noncommercial advertising can be
inconsistent with a forum's use derives from Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 303 (1974) (political advertisements could be excluded from advertising spaces inside
public transportation buses because the city was "engaged in commerce" and reasonably
believed allowing political ads would interfere with revenue). Lehman is in some senses
an outlier, however, and in any event does not control situations in which audiences are
not "captive." See infra, Part IV.B.1.
178. Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d 1144, 1161 (7th Cir. 1995) (Flaum, J., concurring).
B. Excluding Speech Because it is "Noncommercial" is Viewpoint
Based Discrimination
In CBS v. DNC, the Court of Appeals joined an "unbroken line
of authority" holding that "once a forum, subject to First Amendment
constraints, has been opened up for commercial and
'noncontroversial' advertising, a ban on 'controversial' editorial
advertising is unconstitutional unless clearly justified by a clear and
present danger."179 The "clear and present danger" test has of course
fallen out of favor; under current doctrine the restriction would be
examined for viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness of purpose.
Unfortunately other apparent inconsistencies with modern doctrine
cannot be reconciled quite so easily.
The Court of Appeals relied on three federal and two state cases
declaring unconstitutional the refusal of public transportation
officials1" and school newspaper editors1 81 to carry controversial
advertisements. These cases have received rough treatment in the
intervening years; federal courts have refused to extend them to other
publications in which the state is involved, such as law reviews,
12
school yearbooks, '83 and school newspapers. 84 The refusal to extend
the cases on which the Court of Appeals relied rested on the absence
of state action, but the underlying reasoning has been questioned by
other cases that more directly undermine the Court of Appeals'
position. The Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, which upheld the exclusion of advertisements from
state-owned property if they were political rather than commercial,
initially appears most damaging because it seems to suggest that the
179. 450 F.2d 642,659.
180. Kissinger v. New York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Hillside Cmty. Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 455 P.2d 350 (Wash. 1969); Wirta v.
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982 (Cal. 1967).
181. Lee v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969);
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
182. Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3rd Cir. 1967).
183. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc) (rejecting
challenge to high school yearbook's exclusion of an ad encouraging abstinence because no
state action was present).
184. Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (law school newspaper could reject an
advertisement because no state action present); Sinn v. The Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662
(8th Cir. 1987) (no state action if school officials not actually involved in the rejection
because student paper maintained its editorial independence); Mississippi Gay Alliance v.
Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976) (no state action where school paper's editor was
elected by the students and no school official controlled the acceptance or rejection of
ads).
Winter & Spring 2006] NO MODERATOR NEEDED
296 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 33:2&3
distinction can be made on the basis of content rather than viewpoint.
However, as the following Section will show, Lehman allowed the
discrimination based on concerns that are not relevant to
broadcasting. Furthermore, Lehman has been limited in recent years
by courts that have recognized the inconsistency of Lehman with
ISKCON and the fundamental weakness of commercial vs.
noncommercial distinctions.
Part 1 discusses the Lehman opinion, the extent to which it has
been discredited by ISKCON, and the irrelevance of Lehman to the
broadcast-access debate. Part 2 notes a line of D.C. Circuit cases
holding that a commercial/noncommercial distinction is impossible to
draw. The obvious implication of these cases is discussed in Part 3:
even if Lehman's reasoning is accepted as persuasive, the CBS v.
DNC Court of Appeals was correct in its belief that (absent a captive
audience) a commercial/noncommercial distinction is based upon
viewpoint and cannot be made to the detriment of noncommercial
speech.
1. Lehman
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights'85 involved the refusal of a
private corporation, Metromedia, Inc., to rent advertising space
within the city's railcars to Harry J. Lehman, a candidate for state
representative. The basis for excluding Mr. Lehman's message that
he was "Old Fashioned! About Honesty, Integrity, and Good
Government'' " was a contract between Shaker Heights and
Metromedia forbidding the placement of "political advertising in or
upon any of the [City's] cars."1" The Supreme Court of Ohio refused
to order the City to carry Lehman's message because "the
constitutionally protected right of free speech with respect to forums
for oral speech ... does not extend to commercial or political
advertising on rapid transit vehicles."' 88 The conflict of this decision
with the cases relied on by the DNC Court of Appeals led the
Supreme Court to hear the case.
Professor BeVier's lucid analysis of Lehman's effect on doctrine
describes it as "the watershed case" that (at least temporarily and in
retrospect) 89 resolved the doctrinal debate regarding the extent of the
185. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 299.
188. Id. at 301.
189. Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories,
public's right to access a public forum,w but Lehman's current
strength is questionable. The Supreme Court ruled against Mr.
Lehman on limited grounds and under reasoning that is in some
respects flatly inconsistent with post-ISKCON doctrine.
First, the Blackmun plurality made no attempt to separate
restrictions on the advertising space from restrictions appropriate to
other aspects of operating the commercial venture. The decision to
dedicate the space exclusively to commercial speech was viewed as a
decision incidental to the operation of the transit system as a whole,
"little different from deciding to impose a 10-, 25-, or 35-cent fare, or
from changing schedules or the location of bus stops."' 9' This is
clearly at odds with the modern inquiry, which focuses on whether a
right of access for controversial speech will interfere with the
operation of the advertising display qua display.'9
Furthermore, whatever Lehman may have meant before 1992,
Justice O'Connor's ISKCON concurrence requires a far more
searching inquiry than the plurality's perfunctory search for potential
justifications for the exclusion.93 The Lehman plurality applied
rational basis scrutiny to the forum manager's exclusion of political
advertisements, requiring only that "the policies and practices
governing access to the transit system's advertising space must not be
arbitrary, capricious, or invidious."' 94 (Justice Douglas' concurrence
was even more extreme: "a streetcar or bus is plainly not a park or
sidewalk or other meeting place for discussion... [i]f a bus is a forum
it is more akin to a newspaper than a park. Yet if a bus is treated as a
newspaper.. .the owner cannot be forced to include in his offerings
news or other items which outsiders may desire but which the owner
abhors." 95) The plurality viewed rational basis scrutiny as
appropriate because they rejected "a guarantee of nondiscriminatory
access to such publicly owned and controlled areas of communication
1992 SuP. CT. REV. 79, 88.
190. For a thorough account of pre-ISKCON public forum doctrine see id. at 81, n. 8
(citing Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: the History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987)); see also ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 199-266 (1995).
191. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
192. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2nd Cir. 1995); Lebron v.
Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
193. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-4.
194. Id. at 303.
195. Id. at 306.
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regardless of the primary purpose for which the area is dedicated."'96
This is consistent with current doctrine in that no public forum is
presumed to be present unless the property is expressly dedicated to
such use, but (forgivably) neglects to recognize that speakers may
have rights to access limited purpose and nonpublic fora. Even
though there is no "guarantee" that access will be granted, ISKCON
requires "an explanation as to why such a restriction preserves the
property for the several uses to which is has been put. ' 97
The precise contours of the Lehman plurality's dictum are in any
event irrelevant to the broadcasting-access debate, since the opinion
was driven primarily by a concern for captive audiences. The
Blackmun plurality and Justice Douglas both expressed solicitude for
individuals unable to avoid speech: "viewers of billboards and
streetcar signs [who] had no 'choice or volition' to observe such
advertising and had the message 'thrust upon them by all the arts and
devices that skill can produce.. .The radio can be turned off, but not
so the billboard or street car placard."" 98 Judges interpreting Lehman
have noted that "in Lehman, the only position to command a majority
was that the private advertisers who wished to place placards on
buses had no right to subject a captive audience to their message. ' 99
One year after Lehman, the Supreme Court limited the holding (one
can only presume intentionally) by citing the case as establishing one
of the exceptions to the general prohibition on prior restraints.
2
M
Lehman is thus appropriately (and frequently) invoked to allow
the manager of advertising space on public property to draw
distinctions between commercial and political speech due to the
presence of captive audiences in various transportation facilities, but
it is inapplicable to broadcasting, because "the radio can be turned
off."20' It appears important, however, to demonstrate that Lehman
fails to suggest that commercial/noncommercial distinctions are based
on content rather than viewpoint.
196. Id. at 301.
197. 505 U.S. 672, 692.
198. 418 U.S. at 302, 308 (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
199. Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d 1144, 1161 (Flaum, J., concurring).
200. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1975) ("None of
the circumstances qualifying as an established exception to the doctrine of prior restraint
was present. .. There was no captive audience. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights;
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak (Douglas, J., dissenting).").
201. See supra note 198. See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
2. Image Advertising and Viewpoints on Controversial Issues of Public
Importance
In 1974 the FCC concluded that "standard product commercials"
made "no meaningful contribution to informing the public on any
side of any issue," and therefore broadcasters airing such spots could
not be subject to challenge under the fairness doctrine.Y Product
advertisements were not deemed to implicate "the doctrine's central
purpose, which [was] to facilitate 'the development of an informed
public opinion,"'2 3 and the fairness doctrine would apply "only to
those 'commercials' which are devoted in an obvious and meaningful
way to the discussion of public issues."2°"  The declaration that
product advertisements did not implicate the fairness doctrine "was
made with a conscious awareness that it represented a marked shift
from previous FCC policy."2 5 The policy change was made necessary
by a series of complaints (based on the Cullman doctrine) alleging
that networks running various advertisements had violated the
fairness doctrine. Some of the challenged spots were explicitly about
controversial issues, such as the development of oil reserves in
Alaska,2' the desirability of joining the military during the Vietnam
War,207 and the propriety of granting a regulated energy company a
rate increase." Other challenged advertisements hawked products
various activists found noxious, including cigarettes,2' high-powered
automobiles, 21 and snowmobiles.21' These cases are worth noting
because they cast light on the assumptions of the D.C. Circuit at the
time of their CBS v. DNC decision, and offer one resolution of a
question that plagues modern doctrine; is the distinction between
202. In the Matter of The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
The Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 24 (1974)
[hereinafter Fairness Report].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 567 F. 2d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
206. See In Re Complaint by Wilderness Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d 642 (June 39, 1971). (this
line of decisions is frequently referred to as the Esso decision).
207. Green v. FCC and G.I. Association v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir., 1971) (this
was a somewhat complicated decision that held the stations had not violated the fairness
doctrine even if calls for voluntary enlistment implicated the precise issue of American
involvement in Vietnam, because by no stretch of the Court's imagination could anyone
be uninformed about either side of the controversy).
208. In re Complaint of Media Access Project, 44 F.C.C.2d 755 (1973).
209. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
210. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
211. Pub. Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
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commercial and noncommercial speech based on content or
viewpoint?
The extension of the fairness doctrine to product advertisements
began 212 in 1967 when John F. Banzhaf, III demanded that WCBS-TV
provide him with time to propound an anti-smoking message in
response to
all cigarette advertisements which by their portrayals
of youthful or virilelooking or sophisticated persons
enjoying cigarettes in interesting and exciting
situations deliberately seek to create the impression
and present the point of view that smoking is socially
acceptable and desirable, manly, and a necessary part
of a rich full life.1 3
The Commission upheld Mr. Banzhaf's challenge (although they
didn't grant him airtime to reply) stressing "that our holding is limited
to this product-cigarettes., 214 A storm of controversy and requests
for clarification erupted, and the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld the
application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette commercials. Chief
Judge Bazelon, in a widely quoted passage, laid out the unique
characteristics of broadcasting that provided the basis for intrusive
government regulations:
Written messages are not communicated unless they
are read, and reading requires an affirmative act.
Broadcast messages, in contrast, are "in the air." In an
age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a
citizen who does not know some part of a leading
cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary
habitual television watcher can avoid these
commercials only by frequently leaving the room,
212. Strictly speaking, there was precedent for holding that product advertisements
could present points of view on controversial issues. In Petition of Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C.
197 (1946), the FCC suggested that "the advertising of alcoholic beverages can raise
substantial issues of public importance," although it declined to deny an application for a
renewal license by a radio station located in a "temperance belt" that accepted ads for
alcohol and refused to accept anti-liquor ads. The fairness doctrine had not been
articulated in 1946, however, and the case was not followed for 20 years before Mr.
Banzhaf's petition. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1092.
213. Banzhaf, 405 F. 2d at 1086.
214. Id. at 1086 (quoting Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C. 2d 381 (1967)).
changing the channel, or doing some other such
affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which
may be heard even if not listened to, but it may
reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the
written word.215
Banzhaf thus wrote into law two radical propositions: image
advertising could present a viewpoint without ever explicitly
addressing an issue, and the ubiquity and insidious power of
broadcast advertisements imposed a duty on the FCC to provide
opportunities for activists to rebut the messages sent. The obvious
appeal of these theories for litigants doomed the Banzhaf doctrine to
extension, and thus ultimately to abrogation.
In Friends of the Earth, the petitioners complained of "pitches
for large-engine [cars] and high-test gasolines which are generally
described as efficient, clean, socially responsible, and automotively
necessary. 2 16 Just as in Banzhaf, however, the petitioners could point
to no ads specifically stating any of the named propositions, but
instead objected to a pattern of advertisements that favorably
portrayed environmentally unfriendly cars. 17 The FCC refused to
extend Banzhaf, arguing that if ads implying large engines were
beneficial implicated the Fairness Doctrine, so would advertisements
for "a host of other products or services--detergents (particularly
with phosphates), gasoline (especially of a leaded nature), electric
power, airplanes, disposable containers, etc." '218  The Court of
Appeals, however, refused to allow the FCC to render Banzhaf sui
generis, finding that "[ciommercials which continue to insinuate that
the human personality finds greater fulfillment in the large car with
the quick getaway do, it seems to us, ventilate a point of view which
not only has become controversial but involves an issue of public
importance .... the parallel with cigarette advertising is exact and the
215. Id. at 1100-110.
216. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
217. Id. (The advertisements, apparently selected at random, were guilty of the
following sins: "picturing [a Ford Mustang] on a lonely beach, and stressing its
'performance', "stressing the great value of [a Chevrolet Impala's] size ... including the
standard 250-horsepower V-8 engine", "stressing [a Ford Mustang's] size ... and
advocating 'moving up' to a larger car", and "encouraging the use of high-test leaded
gasoline for cold-weather starting.").
218. Id. at 1167.
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relevance of Banzhaf inescapable.,219
Extensions such as Friends of the Earth doomed the application
of the fairness doctrine to product advertisements22" due to
administrative concerns. Consider the far-reaching implications of
the D.C. Circuit's 1971 conclusion that "product advertising by a
department store which was being boycotted as a result of a labor
dispute implicitly raised the issue of whether or not the store should
be patronized, which, given the union strike and boycott, was a
controversial issue of public importance., 221  While the FCC
justifiably feared a deluge of Cullman doctrine complaints, the agency
never questioned the proposition that product advertisements can
represent a viewpoint, or even that they can influence the public. The
removal of product ads from the fairness doctrine was instead based
on the proposition that standard product commercials "cannot be said
to inform the public on a controversial issue of public importance., 222
At this juncture it becomes clear how the application of a liberty
tradition perspective advances a broadcast-access right. Focusing on
the individual's right to express their personal point of view (rather
than the speech's impact on the public's political consciousness), the
federal courts are presented with the following situation: a viewpoint
is being presented via a property owned by the public, and the
managers of that property have the power to deny people the
opportunity to rebut the view. Moreover, dissenters are being
excluded solely on the basis of the viewpoint they seek to air. The
First Amendment clearly cannot permit a viewpoint-discriminatory
prior restraint on a parcel of public property that is actually used for
communication (in the absence of a concern for captive audiences).
To establish that viewpoint discrimination (rather than potentially
permissible content-based discrimination) is in fact implicated,
however, the suggestion that a commercial/noncommercial distinction
represents a permissible content-based restraint must be addressed.
3. Commercial/Political Distinctions are Viewpoint-Based According to
Lehman
Courts have often concluded that Lehman allows forum
219. Id. at 1169.
220. Cigarette advertisements remained off the airwaves, however, because they were
made illegal by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §1335 (2004).
221. Nati'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 567 F. 2d 1095, 1101 n. 15 (summarizing Retail
Store Employees Union, R.C.I.A. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
222. Pub. Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st Cir. 1975).
managers to exclude noncommercial messages only when they enact
"a blanket exclusion of an entire class of potentially controversial
speech," but where a forum manager accepts "political and public-
issue advertising.. .Lehman is not controlling., 223 The implication is
that commercial advertising can somehow be differentiated from
noncommercial advertising due to the innocuous impact of product
solicitations. In fact, Lehman holds no such thing. Justice Douglas,
the crucial vote in Lehman, actually wanted to prevent the city from
placing either type of advertising on its cars because it interfered with
passengers' rights to be let alone.224 He noted that "[c]ommercial
advertisements may be as offensive and intrusive to captive audiences
as any political message," but "the validity of the commercial
advertising program is not before us because we are not faced with
one complaining of an invasion of privacy through forced exposure to
commercial ads." ' The important point for Justice Douglas was that
"petitioner has [no] constitutional right to spread a message before
this captive audience., 226 Thus, despite the fact that commercial and
noncommercial messages could be equally provocative or offensive
(quite possibly they could even offer opposing viewpoints on identical
issues, as previous courts noted 227), any speaker could be excluded
because neither commercial nor noncommercial speakers had any
right to be present. This may be an acceptable position if no forum of
any sort is at issue (which was Justice Douglas' position), but under
current doctrine advertising displays are unquestionably fora of one
sort or another.
Thus Justice Douglas adopted a formulation of the classic "the
greater power includes the lesser" argument-if the state can clearly
prohibit the speech at issue, the argument goes, then First
Amendment values suffer no harm if the state chooses to allow some
other speech it might also have prohibited.228 The strength of this
approach is questionable at best.229 While the Court has relied on it in
223. Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th
Cir. 1985). See also Lebron v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("Unlike [Lehman], where the Supreme Court sustained a ban on all political
advertising inside a city transit system, the Authority here, by accepting political
advertising, has made its subway stations into public fora.").
224. 418 U.S. 298, 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
226. Id.
227. See supra note 180.
228. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (Mass. 1895).
229. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) ("As a matter of
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some important cases, 3 ° Justice Douglas neglected to address the
modern Court's concern with content-based underinclusiveness,
particularly as embodied R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.231 R.A. V. allowed
content-based distinctions between speech only in the absence of a
"realistic possibility that suppression of ideas is afoot., 232 Content-
based distinctions are permissible when the state differentiates
between instances of unprotected speech only if the "basis for content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable. 233  This rationale would justify
prohibiting "only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive
in its prurience.. .[but not]... only that obscenity which includes
offensive political messages." ' Thus, Justice Douglas' tolerance of
the discrimination between commercial and noncommercial speech is
incoherent under current doctrine. He conceded that no independent
basis existed on which to exclude noncommercial speech (both
commercial and noncommercial speech could be intrusive or
offensive), and thus under current doctrine he would be forced to
First Amendment doctrine, the [greater includes the lesser] syllogism is even less
defensible.") (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
230. Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (2003); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
231. R.A. V.'s underlying premise, that content-based discrimination is prohibited when
it raises the possibility of viewpoint-based discrimination, is officially intact, despite my
personal opinion that it was significantly undermined by Virginia v. Black. At issue in
R.A. V. was an ordinance that prohibited placing on public or private property a symbol or
object that the actor knew would cause offense based on race, color, creed, religion, or
gender. The Court struck down the law because it did not prohibit structures that caused
offense on the basis of other factors (such as political affiliation). 505 U.S. at 393. Virginia
v. Black held that Virginia had the power to ban cross burning with the intent to
intimidate, but that the conviction of Black impermissibly rested on a construction of the
ordinance that treated the act of burning a cross as prima facie evidence that the actor had
the intent to intimidate. 123 S.Ct. at 1550. In my view the Virginia statute constitutes
viewpoint discrimination because it is a regulation aimed at an act associated with the
KKK, a group whose viewpoint everyone implicitly understands. (Perhaps there are
nuances in Klan doctrine of which I am unaware and of which the general public is equally
ignorant, but I doubt that they are very interesting). R.A.V. survives Black, however,
because cross burnings are not always aimed at minorities and do not cause fear based on
any particular characteristic. 123 S.Ct. at 1549 ("Unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the
Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward one
of the specified disfavored topics." (internal citation omitted)).
232. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. Scalia chooses as an example a regulation that affected
only obscene movies featuring blue-eyed actresses. He also mentions as a separate
category laws that reach unprotected speech only incidentally, such as Title VII
regulations that may affect only sexually explicit fighting words rather than all fighting
words, but for the purposes of this discussion I think the quote encompasses the Title VII
example as well.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
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conclude that speech of one variety could not be excluded whilst the
other was permitted.
This is the quite close to the position adopted by the four-Justice
Lehman dissent, which rejected the position that "as long as the city
limits its advertising space to innocuous and less controversial
commercial and service oriented advertising, no First Amendment
forum is created." '235 The dissent recognized that commercial speech,
while perhaps less important for the pursuit of self-government than
political speech, "is speech nonetheless, often communicating
information and ideas found by many persons to be controversial.,
236
It was unacceptable to the dissent (just as it was to the D.C. Circuit in
the broadcasting context) that one side of an issue could be discussed,
and not another: "a commercial advertisement peddling snowmobiles
would be accepted, while a counter-advertisement calling upon the
public to support legislation controlling the environmental
destruction and noise pollution cause by snowmobiles would be
rejected." 7 The fact that "the discrimination is among entire classes
of ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular class,
does not render it any less odious," because there was "no evidence in
the record of this case indicating that political advertisements, as a
class, are so disturbing when displayed that they are more likely than
commercial or public service advertisements to impair the rapid
transit system's primary function of transportation.,
238
So, far from overturning the cases on which Johnson and the
Court of Appeals relied, five Lehman Justices offered a ringing
endorsement of the position that "the line between ideological and
nonideological speech is impossible to draw with accuracy.''39 Justice
Douglas' quixotic stand that passengers' right to be let alone trumped
individuals' right to access public property opened for speech does
not obscure this aspect of the Lehman opinion. While a number of
cases have suggested that a fictitious commercial/noncommercial
distinction is not based on viewpoint and thus may be drawn to
exclude political speech from billboards located on public
property240 -almost certainly to the detriment of public discourse-we
235. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
236. Id. at 314.
237. Id. at 317.
238. Id. at 316, 319.
239. Id. at 319.
240. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985); Lebron
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are not bound to perpetuate forever this mistake in the broadcasting
context.
Justice Douglas, the Lehman dissenters, and the rarely cited but
never questioned Banzhaf line of cases all accepted the proposition
that a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is
based on viewpoint rather than content. If broadcasters are state
actors, this distinction cannot be drawn in a public forum-certainly
not to the detriment of "noncommercial" speech. Before the state
action issue is addressed, however, it appears important to
demonstrate that the compelled transmission of an advertorial does
not represent "forced speech" that would offend the liberty tradition.
C. Communicative Activity Contrasted With a Nonpublic Forum
The Court has made it clear that a non-physical forum (a
"forum" unable to contain physical matter) can constitute a doctrinal
public forum. A list of persons or groups can constitute an actual
public forum to which access must be granted. In Rosenberger v.
Rectors of the University of Virginia, the Court characterized a list of
university-funded publications as a "metaphysical" public forum to
which access could not be denied on the basis of viewpoint. This has
been extended to prohibit the government from excluding groups
from such fora on the basis of content and viewpoint,"' but it is
crucial to distinguish between a situation in which the government
provides a forum for private speech but excludes some speakers from
instances of actual speech by a state actor (in which case no forum
analysis applies).242
State actors are free to express a viewpoint, even through private
speakers. 3 or by compiling and conveying the speech of third parties.
v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 U.S App. D.C. 215 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
241. See, e.g., Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000). Not all "metaphysical"
public fora are traditional, however, and not all exclusions are impermissible. See, e.g.,
Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1995) (Texas could
exclude Klan from Adopt-A-Highway sign next to public housing project because
potential for racial strife was permissible viewpoint-neutral basis for exclusion). See also,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Cowparade, LLC, 105 F. Supp.2d 294, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
242. Suggestions have been made that recent cases have opened up the possibility of a
"government speech forum" with its own rules of access, but such a doctrinal stretch, while
an interesting proposition, has not been recognized by the federal courts. See Randall P.
Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech
Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953 (1998).
243. Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("[W]e have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is
the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.").
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In Cuffley v. Bennett,2" for example, a public radio station declined
sponsorship from the KKK in order to avoid offering a fifteen-second
on-air underwriting acknowledgment. This was permissible because
"[a]lthough the logograms, slogans, and product summaries in these
fifteen-second acknowledgements may in fact identify the
underwriter, conveyance of this collateral information remains a
communicative act of the government, even if it only involves a
compilation of third-party speech. 2 5 The acknowledgements did not
"fall within the conventional understandings of promotional
advertising", 2' but rather were "related to the journalistic purposes of
the station, in that the acknowledgements convey important,
federally-mandated information to the public about the source of
funding for particular broadcast material., 247 Since the announcement
was an integral part of the program on which it would appear, it
would be attributed to the government actor responsible for the
program, and the decision to reject sponsorship thus fell within the
broad ambit of "editorial" or "journalistic" discretion.
An entirely different situation is presented when the government
transmits the speech of third parties without associating itself with the
content of that speech. In Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes,2" for example, a candidate debate aired on a
public television station constituted a nonpublic forum rather than
government speech because "[c]onsistent with the long tradition of
candidate debates, the implicit representation of the broadcaster was
that the views expressed were those of the candidates, not its own.,
29
Forbes and Bennett illustrate the broadly applicable approach to
editorial discretion and forced speech; retransmissions implicate the
conduit's First Amendment rights only if there is a danger that
transmitting a message will cause others to view the conduit as
adopting the message.
1. Forced Speech
Individuals cannot be forced to engage in a speech-related action
representing the affirmation of a belief because "the choice to speak
244. Cuffley v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
245. Id. at 1094 n.9.
246. Id. at 1095.
247. Id. at 1096.
248. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
249. Id. at 675.
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includes within it the choice of what not to say."" ° Thus individuals
cannot be compelled to display a state motto on their private
property 211 or to salute the flag. 252  But not all acts represent the
affirmation of belief or attitude. For instance, individuals cannot
object to bearing currency with the "In God We Trust" slogan
because it is not displayed to the public with the implication that the
bearer endorses the message.23 The social understanding is that the
use of money has zero communicative significance. The social
understanding of advertising is essentially the same. This cannot be
said of programs. A program represents an attempt to communicate
something; the social meaning attached to a broadcast program is that
it is a product the broadcaster stands behind, a presentation the
broadcaster feels is worth watching. 4
The distinction between re-transmitting a message without
adopting it as ones' own and associating oneself with the message was
illustratively drawn in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group, in which the Supreme Court held that a parade
organizer could not be forced to include a group of homosexuals of
Irish-American ancestry in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade because
"this use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message., 255 The parade
250. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (citing
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974)).
251. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,713 (1977).
252. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
253. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.15 (1977) ("That question is not before us today but we
note that currency, which is passed from hand to hand, differs in significant respects from
an automobile, which is readily associated with its operator .... The bearer of currency is
thus not required to publicly advertise the national motto." ).
254. In the early days of radio, Congress provided that no broadcaster was to be
deemed a "common carrier" in part because of the fact that radio stations financed
themselves by the sale of large blocs of time over which entire programs were broadcast.
There are a few more recent parallels; for instance, Ford Motor Company famously
sponsored NBC's unedited broadcast of the film Schindler's List in 1997. See H.R. Con.
Res. 30, 105th Cong. (1997) (To commend the National Broadcast Company, and the Ford
Motor Company, for broadcasting the film 'Schindler's List' in its original, unedited
version and without commercial interruption). In that particular case, the decision to air
the program had some core of communicative meaning-all the more effective because it
represented a departure from usual practice. The more typical instance in which
sponsored programming (commercial advertising) is aired, however, does not involve a
broadcaster's evaluation of the value of the message, and does not carry a risk that the
broadcaster will be associated with the viewpoint presented.
255. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995)
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itself was an expressive act, and "[s]ince every participating unit affects
the message conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts'
application of the statute produced an order essentially requiring
petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade. 256
2. The Compelled Transmission of an Advertorial Does Not Constitute
Forced Speech
The risk of message distortion recognized in Hurley is not
implicated by requiring broadcasters to sell time on a viewpoint-
neutral basis. The Court has certainly recognized that when a
broadcaster "exercises editorial discretion in the selection and
presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity, 257 and
that "a speaker need not 'generate, as an original matter, each item
featured in the communication. '' 258 But it would be difficult for any
broadcaster to argue that each advertisement broadcast constitutes a
"participating unit" that "affects the message., 259
In fact, not only has the Court invariably declined to hold that a
broadcaster has an interest in freedom from forced speech during
advertising time, they held precisely the opposite in CBS v. FCC,
which approved a statutory scheme forcing broadcasters to carry
unwanted messages regarding political candidates.26 While it would
be an egregious over-reading of CBS v. FCC to say that it recognized
an individual right to access the airwaves,26' the Court did assign the
interests of the sponsors of noncommercial advertorials some weight
in the constitutional scales,262 echoing the DNC Court's assignment of
some unspecified weight to the interests of advertorial sponsors. The
CBS v. FCC Court went further, however: broadcasters' interests in
256. Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
257. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (emphasis added).
258. Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. 557, 570).
259. This is consistent with the implication of CBS v. DNC, as well as more recent
cases. In Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994), for example, the Court
implied that a cable company's First Amendment interests in freedom from forced speech
were at stake where they were dealing with units ("Through 'original programming or by
exercising editorial control over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,'
cable programmers and operators see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of
topics and in a wide variety of formats."') (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns,
Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986)).
260. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
261. Relying on CBS v. DNC, the Court explicitly renounced any intention to provide
"a general right of access to the media." Id. at 396 (emphasis in original).
262. Id. ("The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as
broadcasters, are implicated by [the statutory right of forced access].").
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freedom of speech were not threatened by the forced transmission of
advertorials because the statute "[did] not impair the discretion of
broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any
particular type of programming., 26 3  Thus CBS v. FCC explicitly
recognized what the Court tacitly admitted in CBS v. DNC--carrying
an advertisement does not impair the ability of a broadcaster to
propound its own views and does not implicate the liberty tradition's
objection to forced speech.26
If the broadcaster faces little risk of being identified with a
message, why then has the Court recognized a cognizable First
Amendment interest in the transmission of advertisements for third
parties?2 65 One answer is that those paid to transmit an advertisement
suffer at least a monetary harm when the person who wishes to place
the advertisement cannot speak, and that a broadcaster, printer, etc.
who wishes to accept the ad can be trusted to adequately represent
the rights of the person denied a vehicle for communicating with the
public. An answer that perhaps better illuminates the underlying
issues involved is that personal autonomy does not form the basis for
protecting the transmission of advertisements-advertisements are
protected under the political tradition's rationales: "even if the
broadcasters' interest in conveying [advertisements] is entirely
pecuniary, the interests of, and benefit to, the audience may be
broader. ,
2 6 6
In New York Times v. Sullivan, for example, the extension of
First Amendment protection to the contents of the advertisement had
nothing to do with a concern for the Times' interest in liberty, it was
motivated primarily by the political tradition's concern with the
advertisement's effect on public debate. 267  The secondary First
263. Id. at 397.
264. Furthermore, explicit disclaimers are available to further separate the broadcaster
from the message. In Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, (1980), the Court
suggested the conditions under which a right of access to a privately managed forum is
consistent the First Amendment: "The views expressed by members of the public in
passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition ... will not likely be identified
with those of the owner. Second, no specific message is dictated by the State to be
displayed on appellants' property.... Finally, as far as appears here appellants can
expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area
where the speakers or handbillers stand." Id. at 88.
265. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); FCC v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418 (1993).
266. Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc., 527 U.S. at 185.
267. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
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Amendment interests were the liberty interests of the ad's sponsors;
the Justices prohibited the imposition of damages based on the "libel"
in the ad because "[a]ny other conclusion would discourage
newspapers from carrying "editorial advertisements" of this type, and
so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access
to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech
even though they are not members of the press."2'6 The Supreme
Court has regrettably lost sight of this latter rationale, but subsequent
opinions protecting the transmission of advertisements have focused
on the ads' informational value rather than the First Amendment
interests of the broadcaster of the advertisement.
Even before Virginia Pharmacy Board extended doctrinal
protection to commercial speech on the basis that it provided
information to the public,269 the Court established in Bigelow v.
Virginia that newspapers carrying commercial advertisements were
protected due to the ads' informational function rather than the
speech interest of the editor or the newspaper. Indeed, even when
the argument was raised that due to the particular social
circumstances (and the "underground" nature of the publication), the
appearance of an advertisement for abortions in a newspaper was "an
implicit editorial endorsement of its message, 270 the Court declined
to adopt or even address this rationale. The Court instead focused
primarily on the public's interest in receiving truthful communications
regarding lawful activity. The newspaper editor perhaps would not
have prevailed had not his "First Amendment interests [in freedom of
the press-not of speech] coincided with the constitutional interests
of the general public.
271
V. Public Forum Analysis When Private Actors are Involved
It is clear that if the First Amendment forbids anything, it bans
governmental viewpoint discrimination in any forum. Unfortunately
for the fate of public discourse, it is not at all clear that a broadcaster
counts as a state actor. CBS v. DNC did not decide the issue, but
268. Id. at 266.
269. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,761 (1976).
270. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 n.7 (1975) ("It was argued, too, that under
the circumstances the appearance of the advertisement in the appellant's newspaper was
'an implicit editorial endorsement' of its message." (citing Brief for Appellant 29)).
271. Id. at 822.
272. See supra notes 58 and 122.
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the Court has generally been reluctant to find constitutionally
cognizable state action when the government does not compel private
action, but merely tolerates it.273 The Court has identified a number
of circumstances in which private action can be fairly attributed to the
State,274 but the ultimate conclusion that the State bears responsibility
for an ostensibly private act "is a matter of normative judgment, and
the criteria lack rigid simplicity."275  The licensing fees paid by
broadcasters would probably not be found to constitute the type of
symbiotic relationship between a discriminatory private actor and the
State held impermissible in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,276 although an argument could be made to that effect.2 7 7 It
is equally unlikely that a litigant could convince the modern Court
that a broadcaster's viewpoint discrimination is fairly attributable to
the State under a "joint action" or "entwinement" theory.278
The First Amendment, however, does not entirely disappear
when the government utilizes an agent to manage property. State
273. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (despite State involvement in the
provision of medical services-significant Medicaid subsidies and some bureaucratic
oversight-private nursing homes were not acting under the influence of the state to an
extent that the private homes had to provide due process when reclassifying patients);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (heavily subsidized private school for
troubled youth need not respect First Amendment rights of employees because no state
compulsion, education not an exclusively state function, and insufficient entanglement);
Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
274. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 296
(2001).
275. Id. at 295.
276. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
277. Weaker arguments have carried the day. For instance, in Citizens to End Animal
Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 745 F.Supp. 65 (D. Mass.
1990), the Court found that among considerations pointing to state action "most
important, the City derives an economic benefit from defendant's policy of restrictions, at
least as direct as that found in Burton." Id. at 73. But the revitalization of a downtown
area is probably not the sort of integrated private/public involvement in a single discrete
venture that Burton had in mind: Burton noted that the restaurant at issue was an
"indispensable part of the State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." 365
U.S. at 723-24 (emphasis added). Most state action cases focus on whether the private
portion of an integrated private/public venture is necessary to the financial success of a
discrete venture, not the overall financial health of the government. See, e.g., Jatoi v.
Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987) (characterizing private
management company as a state actor where financial success of hospital depended on its
services).
278. For a searching application of these state action theories to privately managed
property, see Sw. Cmty. Res., Inc. v. Simon Prop. Group, 108 F. Supp.2d 1239 (D. N.M.
2000) (holding manager of shopping mall was not a state actor despite presence of
government offices in mall, significant contacts between mall security and city police, and
publicly owned transportation system's integration with mall).
action has been found in public forum cases involving private actors
using a line of analysis deriving from Marsh v. Alabama279: if a private
actor is managing a public forum located on public property, then it is
performing a traditional public function and speech restrictions are
treated as state action' ° Alternatively stated, if publicly owned
property is deliberately opened to the public for communicative
purposes, the government cannot invest a private actor with
management rights that infringe the public's First Amendment rights.
Marsh is infrequently relied on to find state action under a public
function rationale, and generally receives a narrow interpretation."'
The Supreme Court has understandably been loath to grant Marsh an
expansive interpretation, in large part because the increasing
privatization of 'public' functions would be hindered if the actions of
283private subcontractors were subjected to constitutional scrutiny.
The Fourth Circuit has gone so far as to assert that "[t]he Supreme
Court has held that state action can only be found under the authority
of Marsh where 'a private enterprise [assumes] all of the attributes of
a state-created municipality' and performs 'the full spectrum of
municipal powers."284 This is misleading, and if not downright false it
flatly contradicts the approach of other Circuits.28 The Court's cases
analyzing Marsh within the First Amendment context neither give
Marsh such a narrow reading nor mandate that Marsh be extended to
279. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
280. See Faneuil Hall, 745 F.Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990), holding in the alternative that
Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc. was managing a public forum, providing a doctrinally
defensible reason for holding that petitioners' First Amendment rights had been violated.
See also Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the Oregon Arena Corporation
was a state actor for First Amendment purposes because it controlled a traditional public
forum).
281. Marsh's application has been limited because the Court has held firmly to history
in determining what constitutes a "traditional" public forum and has narrowly construed
what counts as an "exclusively" governmental function. "While many functions have been
traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the
State."' Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356 (1974)).
282. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-164 (declining "to extend the sovereign-
function doctrine outside of its present carefully confined bounds").
283. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369
(2003) ("Private entities provide a vast array of social services for the government;
administer core aspects of government programs; and perform tasks that appear
quintessentially governmental.").
284. United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976)) (alterations in
original).
285. See infra, Part V.C.
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realms of constitutional law divorced from the First Amendment.
This Section argues that Marsh means the First Amendment can
be violated when private parties manage property into which the
public has been invited for expressive activity. Part A examines
Marsh and subsequent cases that limited it. Part B argues that,
properly understood, Marsh focuses on the character of the invitation
extended to the public, and not whether the property at issue is a
"traditional public forum." Part C notes recent cases that have
accepted Marsh's implicit proposition that private actors are
restricted by the First Amendment when they control a distinct
portion of property held out to the public as a forum open for
discourse. Part D notes potential objections to the approach
advocated, and concludes that when this rationale is understood as
applying solely to First Amendment activities on publicly-owned but
privately managed property, the implications of this approach do not
threaten settled doctrine.
A. Speech in a Privately Managed Forum
At issue in Marsh was the trespassing conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who distributed literature without a permit in the business
district of a classic company town. The Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation owned the residential buildings, the sewers and the
sewage disposal plant, the streets and sidewalks, and the "business
block" which was used by the public as their regular shopping
286
center. Each business displayed a sign proclaiming the area private
property and prohibiting solicitation without a permit. Ms. Marsh
was arrested for her refusal to stop distributing religious literature
after she "was warned that she could not distribute the literature
without a permit and told that no permit would be issued to her."287
The Supreme Court reversed her trespassing conviction because
the Corporation's restriction on speech would be impermissible if
enacted by a municipality, and "[w]hether a corporation or a
municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has
an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such
manner that the channels of communication remain free." It is
important to note that the First Amendment had been violated not
because the courts of Alabama convicted Marsh and therefore
violated Marsh's rights, but because of an impermissible delegation of
286. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-3.
287. Id. at 503.
288. Id. at 507.
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power by the State that resulted in the infringement of the rights of
the residents of Chickasaw. The fact that "property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of liberty... [occurred].. .were held
by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to
restrict their fundamental liberties.,
289
The Court relied on Marsh 22 years later for the proposition that
"under some circumstances property that is privately owned may, at
least for First Amendment purposes, be treated as though it were
publicly held. '' 290 The Logan Valley Court held that such a
circumstance was provided when the owners of a privately owned
shopping plaza obtained an injunction against labor picketing
targeted at a store in the plaza. The Court struck down the injunction
because the plaza had been opened to general public and the "State
may not delegate the power.. .wholly to exclude those members of
the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put. ' 29 ' The Court concluded
that this was an impermissible prior restraint because the "prohibition
against trespass on the mall operates to bar all speech within the
shopping center to which [the owners] object. ', 21 Marshall, writing
for the Court, inserted a prescient footnote noting that the picketing
"was directed specifically at patrons" of a business "located within the
shopping center and the message sought to be conveyed to the public
concerned the manner in which that particular market was being
operated., 293  He noted that the Court specifically reserved the
question of whether a mall owner could "consistently with the First
Amendment, justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly
related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center
property was being put."'294 The Court was called upon to decide this
question four years later.
Lloyd Corporation. v. Tanner291 involved five people forced to
leave a privately owned shopping mall under threat of arrest for
289. Id. at 509.
290. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
316 (1968).
291. Id. at 319-20.
292. Id. at 323.
293. Id. at 320 n.9.
294. Id.
295. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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distributing leaflets. The mall prohibited the distribution of handbills
because it "was considered likely to annoy customers, to create litter,
potentially to create disorders, and generally to be incompatible with
the purpose of the Center and the atmosphere sought to be
preserved.,296 The Court held, over a stirring dissent by Marshall
(joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart), the ejection of the
leafleters permissible because the protest was not directly related "to
the use to which the shopping center property was being put" and
because ample alternative opportunities were available for the
speakers "to convey their message to their intended audience.
2
1
Powell, writing for the Court, did not purport to overrule Logan
Valley, but explicitly distinguished it because of the "scope of the
invitation extended to the public. The invitation [in Lloyd was] to
come to the Center to do business with the tenants., 291 Powell
approvingly noted the nondiscriminatory (content-neutral) nature of
the ban,299 but primarily relied on the determination that, unlike in
Marsh and Logan Valley, "there has been no such dedication of
Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use
as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First
Amendment rights."3°° Strange, then, that four years later in Hudgens
v. National Labor Relations Board the Court abrogated Logan Valley
because of its perceived conflict with Lloyd.3 °1
In Hudgens, the Court determined that the National Labor
Relations Act controlled the ability of labor picketers to enter a
private shopping center almost identical to the one at issue in Lloyd,
and that the "constitutional guarantee of free expression" therefore
had no part to play. Justice Stewart, a Lloyd dissenter, delivered
the Court's opinion, pleading stare decisis.3 According to Stewart, "if
the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment
right to enter this shopping center to distribute handbills concerning
296. Id. at 555-56.
297. Id. at 563.
298. Id. at 564.
299. Id. at 567 ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free
speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private
property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." (emphasis added)).
300. Id. at 570.
301. Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
302. Id. at 521.
303. "It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe that the
Logan Valley case was rightly decided. Our institutional duty is to follow until changed
the law as it now is, not as some Members of the Court might wish it to be." Id. at 518.
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Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a First
Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of
advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co."3" Stewart went
on to claim that the Court made "it clear now, if it was not clear
before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's
decision in the Lloyd case."3 5 He was joined in this statement by four
Justices," but his reasoning was accepted only by Blackmun and
Rehnquist.
Justice White filed a concurring opinion noting that Lloyd "did
not overrule Logan Valley, either expressly or implicitly. '' 30 He
nevertheless concurred in the result because "the First Amendment
protection established by Logan Valley was expressly limited to the
picketing of a specific store for the purpose of conveying information
with respect to the operation in the shopping center of that store."''
Hudgens involved a picket by employees of Butler's warehouses who
were unhappy about the company's actions in negotiating a labor
dispute which had nothing to do with the retail operations of the
store. White saw "no need belatedly to overrule Logan Valley, only
to follow it as it is. 
''3 9
Powell and Burger joined the Court's opinion in full, but stated
(in a concurrence by Powell), that they agreed with White's view that
Lloyd "did not overrule [Logan Valley], and that the present case can
be distinguished narrowly from Logan Valley., 310 They joined the
Court's opinion because they concluded that Justice Black had
originally been correct when he argued that Marsh did not compel the
Logan Valley result. Powell was concerned that the "law in this
area.. .has been less than clear since Logan Valley analogized a
shopping center to the 'company town' in [Marsh],"3"' and believed
that the "Court's opinion today clarifies the confusion engendered by
these cases by accepting Mr. Justice Black's reading of Marsh... 3t 2
Hudgens remains good law,13 and the clear majority of the Court
304. Id. at 520-21.
305. Id. at 518.
306. Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell, and Burger joined his opinion.
307. Id. at 524 (White, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 524.
309. Id. at 525.
310. Id. at 523 (Powell, J., concurring).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 524.
313. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Denver Area
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held not that Lloyd overturned Logan Valley, but that Justice Black's
interpretation of Marsh (as revealed by the Marsh opinion itself as
well as his Logan Valley dissent314) controls the doctrine. So what
does Marsh mean, if it does not extend First Amendment protection
to expressive conduct within a privately owned mall? Part B of this
section demonstrates that Marsh stands for the proposition that the
government may not invest a private agent with the power to exclude
discretionarily speech from a forum into which the public is invited
for expressive purposes. It is the character of the invitation and the
nature of the property that controls the First Amendment inquiry.
B. Marsh's Meaning: The First Amendment Restricts Private Actors
Who Regulate Fora Into Which the Public Are Invited for
Expressive Purposes
Justice Black is sometimes portrayed as a free speech absolutist,
but in fact he was quite sensitive to government's desire to regulate
the times and places for speech activity."' His Logan Valley dissent
reflects his solicitude for the activities disrupted and persons
disturbed by unrestricted speech activity.316 He was a champion of
speech rights because he believed the facilitation of democracy was
the central purpose of the First Amendment, and was willing to
accept regulations of speech that did not interfere with the process of
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 783 (1996).
314. Justice White joined Black in dissent in Logan Valley, echoing and clarifying
Black's conclusion that "[iun no sense are any parts of the shopping center dedicated to the
public for general purposes." Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 338 (White, J., dissenting).
315. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 162 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is
high time to challenge the assumption in which too many people have too long acquiesced,
that groups that think they have been mistreated or that have actually been mistreated
have a constitutional right to use the public's streets, buildings, and property to protest
whatever, wherever, whenever they want, without regard to whom such conduct may
disturb."); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) ("there is no merit to the
petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the
jail custodian's objections... [s]uch an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the
assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional
right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of
constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in [Cox v. Louisiana]. We
reject it again."); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
316. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[P]etitioners cannot, under
the guise of exercising First Amendment rights, trespass on respondent Weis' private
property for the purpose of picketing. It would be just as sensible for this Court to allow
the pickets to stand on the check-out counters, thus interfering with customers who wish
to pay for their goods, as it is to approve picketing in the pickup zone which interferes with
customers' loading of their cars.").
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orderly democratic self-government. His Marsh opinion is clearly
motivated by these political tradition concerns,
Many people in the United States live in company-
owned towns. Just as all other citizens they must make
decisions which affect the welfare of community and
nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed.
In order to enable them to be properly informed their
information must be uncensored. There is no more
reason for depriving these people of the liberties
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect
to any other citizen. 17
Black thus insists on First Amendment protection for Ms. Marsh's
speech because denying it would infringe on the rights of the citizenry
as a whole to receive essential information.318 With Justice Black's
concerns in mind, it becomes clear that his Logan Valley dissent was
not due to a belief that Marsh represented a sui generis opinion. Marsh
reaches all situations in which a private actor has regulatory authority
over "facilities built and operated primarily to benefit the public."31 9
The Court later made it a matter of doctrine that some facilities of this
nature, such as the sidewalk at issue in Marsh, are intrinsically
conducive to speech activity, and began to call this subset "traditional
public fora."32 Justice Black's desire to limit the extension of Marsh
was rooted in the notion that only in a traditional public forum was the
limitation of speech a threat to democracy.
Black extended First Amendment protection to streets in the
company town by pointing to precedent establishing constitutional
restrictions on "the owners of privately held bridges, ferries,
turnpikes and railroads., 321 He reasoned that "since their operation is
essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation.. .such
regulations may not result in an operation of these facilities, even by
317. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
318. "As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the
First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free government by free men'...." Id. at 509
(quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
319. Id. at 506.
320. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
321. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
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privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes
with 322 the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.323 In Chickasaw,
"the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by
the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from
any other town and shopping center except for the fact that title to
the property belongs to a private corporation. ' '324 Therefore a private
corporation had no more right than a municipality to "completely bar
the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on
its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute
dependent on a.. .permit to be issued by an official who could deny it
at will. ' 32 Had he written Marsh after the Court adopted its current
system of classification, Black surely would have substituted "public
fora" for "streets, sidewalks and public places."
Black dissented from the extension of Marsh to the shopping
center at issue in Logan Valley because two closely related
considerations indicated that the Logan Valley Plaza was not a public
forum: the incompatibility of the property at issue with expressive
activity, and the lack of the vital component of an invitation to the
public. Black analyzed the intended uses of a property and the
property owner's intent to dedicate it to speech activity in order to
determine whether the property was a public forum.3 26 He therefore
dissented in Logan Valley because, given the facts of the case, he
could see no way that the area in which the speech occurred was
dedicated to or conducive to speech activity.3 27 He and Justice White
322 Id.
323. I cut off the Marsh quote mid-sentence because it actually reads "interferes with
and discriminates against interstate commerce." Parsing this quote was necessary for
clarity, however, because in 1946 the incorporation of the First Amendment against the
states was not an automatically understood aspect of constitutional jurisprudence, and
Black felt it necessary to note that "certainly the corporation can no more deprive people
of freedom of press and religion than it can discriminate against commerce." Id. at 507
n.4. The footnote points out that this had been established a mere three years earlier in
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943).
324. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
325. Id. at 504.
326. Adderly, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (distinguishing an earlier case where the Court upheld a
right of peaceful protest on government property, Black observed that "In Edwards, the
demonstrators went to the South Carolina State Capitol grounds to protest. In this case
they went to the jail. Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails,
built for security purposes, are not." Black later noted that the protestors were "on that
part of the jail grounds reserved for jail uses ... the State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47).
327. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting).
agreed that no invitation to the public to use the property for speech
purposes had been extended. In Black's view, this meant that a
private actor was free to restrict speech activities within the property,
just as a State actor could constitutionally do.
When the government is acting as a proprietor, "some public
property is available for some uses and not for others; some public
property is neither designed nor dedicated for use by pickets or for
other communicative activities. 328  However, Logan Valley and
Marsh provide an obvious corollary to this statement: sometimes
putatively private property is dedicated to communicative activities,
and sometimes those exercising control can be subject to the
strictures of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has not often
relied explicitly on Marsh to develop its public forum doctrine, but it
has also never cast doubt on Marsh's proposition that if an invitation
to the public at large to use property for speech purposes is extended,
a private actor controlling the property is bound by the same
principles as a government actor.
Marsh, Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens illustrate that no
matter where official title lies, the sine qua non of a public forum
(traditional, designated, or limited purpose) is an invitation to enter
and speak. This principle runs through each case, and in each case
the majority and dissent split not because of disagreement over this
principle, but because of disagreement over whether a cognizable
"invitation" was present. Marsh rests on the proposition that there is
an implicit invitation to engage in First Amendment activity on
streets and sidewalks, whether the property is formally private or
public.329 Logan Valley assumes that a private property owner
extends an implicit invitation to enter and speak if two conditions are
present: (1) the speech concerns matters that directly pertain to the
operation of the property, and (2) there are no effective alternative
channels of communication. Lloyd purportedly approved both of the
Logan Valley conditions and simply decided they were not met on the
facts, but the Hudgens Court later decided that the Lloyd majority
adopted the dissenting views of Justices White and Black in Logan
Valley: "The public is invited to the premises but only in order to do
business with those who maintain establishments there ... There is no
general invitation to use the parking lot, the pickup zone, or the
sidewalk except as an adjunct to shopping. ' 3 ' The lack of an
328. Id. at 338 (White, J., dissenting).
329. See supra note 161.
330. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 565 (quoting Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 338 (White, J.,
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invitation to use the private facilities for public discourse meant that
no public forum had been created.
The Court now examines the actual uses and intrinsic
characteristics of property, both public and private,33' to determine
the extent to which the public has been invited to use the property
(alternatively stated, whether property has been designated to public
use) and the compatibility of the property with expressive activity.
Part C will establish that recent cases have made it clear that when
the government grants a private actor control over a forum in which
expressive activity is appropriate, the First Amendment applies. 2
C. Recent Cases: Private Actors Exercising Property Rights over a
Public Forum
In Venetian Casino v. Local Joint Executive Board,333 the Ninth
Circuit rejected a private property owner's attempt to rely on Lloyd
and Hudgens, ruling that the owner of a private sidewalk could not
restrict speech activity due to "the dedication of the sidewalk to
public use."33 ' The controversy arose because county and city officials
wished to widen Las Vegas Boulevard in order to deal with a
projected increase in traffic caused by the construction of the new
Venetian casino, but the new lane of traffic would leave no public
right-of-way for a public sidewalk. Fortunately for the officials, the
Venetian's developers needed a building permit, and thus an
agreement was reached between the State Department of
Transportation and the developers that Venetian would construct and
maintain, on private property, a "private sidewalk connecting to
public sidewalks on either side of its property.""33  After police
refused to disperse a 1,300 person union demonstration on the private
sidewalk, Venetian sought a declaratory judgment that the sidewalk
was not a public forum. The District Court ruled against Venetian,
dissenting)).
331. See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Venetian Casino v. Local Joint
Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (sidewalks need not be government
owned to constitute public fora).
332. The cases discussed below were not the first to establish this proposition. See, e.g.,
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir.
2000). ("Although the sale of the land ... ended any direct government action that would
constitute endorsement, the sale has given this sectarian message preferential access to
... a public forum.").
333. Venetian Casino, 257 F.3d 937.
334. Id. at 947.
335. Id. at 940.
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Court looked to the history and physical characteristics of
the sidewalk, rejecting Venetian's contention that "cases such as
Kokinda that address whether a sidewalk or other space is a public
forum are inapplicable to this case because they all presuppose that
the property at issue is government owned. 33 6 The Court reasoned
that since the sidewalk was not "intended solely to be used to
facilitate the patronage" of the casino, the invitation extended to the
public was of a more general character; pedestrians were invited to
use the sidewalk to traverse downtown Las Vegas. Since "streets and
sidewalks are the archetype of the public forum", "free speech is
certainly incidental to pedestrian traffic." '337 Therefore the invitation
extended by Venetian to the public to use the sidewalk for
transportation purposes necessarily encompassed an implicit
invitation to use to sidewalk for expressive purposes, whether or not
the property owner recognized it at the time the agreement with the
government was signed.
The Ninth Circuit unfortunately allowed one irrelevant
consideration to enter an otherwise admirable opinion when they
briefly considered the subjective intent of the parties.38 It is not clear
why this would be relevant, given the Supreme Court's admonition in
Forbes that "traditional public fora are open for expressive activity
regardless of the government intent," 9 and the court did not proceed
to adequately address the extent to which Venetian's subjective
understanding might (or might not) be relevant, instead merely using
the agreement between the State and the Venetian to suggest that the
Venetian should have known what it was in for. Fortunately, the
Tenth Circuit expanded on Venetian Casino in a particularly
illuminating manner, demonstrating that expectations are irrelevant,
whether the expectations are possessed by a private actor managing
government property or a state actor granting property rights.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City involved a challenge by
several groups to the prohibition of expressive activity on privately
owned land encompassing a pedestrian easement.' Salt Lake City
sold a public street to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
336. Id. at 946 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)).
337. Id. at 943.
338. Id. ("The Venetian would have us believe that the parties did not intend the
replacement sidewalk on the Venetian property to be a public forum.").
339. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
340. 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002)
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(LDS), with the condition that the City retained a perpetual
pedestrian easement and that the property should be held in a
manner that would "maintain, encourage, and invite public use."341
The Planning Commission originally suggested that in order to
preserve the public's First Amendment rights, the terms of the
easement should provide "that there be no restrictions on the use of
this space that are more restrictive than is currently permitted at a
public park," but this suggestion was rejected by the City Council."42
The property was instead transferred to LDS with stipulation that
nothing "shall be deemed to create or constitute a public forum,
limited or otherwise, on the Property," and that LDS would have the
right to deny access to the property to individuals engaged in a variety
of activities implicating the First Amendment, including "loitering,
assembling, partying, demonstrating, picketing, distributing literature,
soliciting, begging...,,3 43 The District Court rejected the plaintiffs'
facial challenge to the easement restrictions, and held that the
restrictions were reasonable because the property would not
otherwise have been sold and because "the prohibited [First
Amendment] activities [were] incompatible with the property's new
purpose, an ecclesiastical park." 344 The Tenth Circuit reversed.
The Tenth Circuit initially rejected LDS's argument that the
First Amendment did not apply to the pedestrian easement due to the
agreement's express exclusion of speech activities:345
We agree that the reservation of easement on its face
defines the easement to exclude expressive activities.
However, a deed does not insulate government action
from constitutional review. If government actions
taken with respect to the easement violate the
Constitution, this simply means that the easement
terms themselves are unconstitutional and must be
altered or eliminated.3'
341. Id. at 1118 (emphasis in original).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1119.
344. Id. at 1120. The District Court also held that the restrictions did "not constitute
viewpoint discrimination because the LDS Church, as private owner of the plaza property,
has greater rights on the easement than members of the public."
345. Id. at 1121.
346. Id. at 1122.
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Perhaps in this part of the opinion the Court's language could be
refined. There were no 'government actions taken with respect to the
easement' for the Court to observe, there was merely purposeful
government neglect-the refusal to maintain the public's First
Amendment rights. The Court believed "the issue before us is
whether it is constitutionally permissible for the City to retain a
pedestrian easement but prohibit expressive conduct on that
easement., 347  However, given the terms of the reservation, the
question the Court really faced was whether the City could allow a
private actor to prohibit expressive conduct on the easement. The
question was (to echo Marsh): could the city transfer public forum
property to a private party in a manner permitting a private actor "to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties" to engage in speech activity? Had the court adopted this
formulation of the issue, however, the analysis and answer would
have been the same.
The Tenth Circuit next determined that the government's lack of
possessory interest in the land did not preclude forum analysis, citing
Marsh for the proposition that "title to property [is] not necessarily
determinative of public speech rights on property, ' 48 and Venetian
Casino for the proposition that "sidewalks need not be government
owned to constitute public fora.,
349
The Court then found that the property constituted a traditional
public forum, despite the City's "express intention not to create a
public forum. The government cannot simply declare the First
Amendment status of property regardless of its nature and its public
use." 35 0  The Tenth Circuit adopted the approach dictated by
Kennedy's Kokinda concurrence"' (accepted as binding precedent by
the 10"h Circuit because Kennedy "provided the fifth vote on the
narrowest grounds"352): objective factors rather than government
347. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 n.4.
348. Id. at 1122 (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505).
349. Id. (citing Venetian Casino v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 945 n.6
(9th Cir. 2001).
350. Id. at 1124.
351. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737-39 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
352. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1125 n.6. The Court, however, cited
O'Connor's ISKCON concurrence as the controlling precedent, Id. at 1125 n.7, on how "to
determine the easement's nature and purpose," and thus asked "whether expressive
activity is compatible with the purposes and uses to which the government has lawfully
dedicated the property, not whether the government has expressly designated speech as a
purpose of the property." Id. at 1125. This may have been unwarranted, because
Winter & Spring 20061
326 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 33:2&3
intent control an inquiry into whether a sidewalk should count as a
public forum.353 The Court determined that the actual purpose and
use of the easement was a pedestrian walkway354 and that the walkway
was not limited to providing access to one building or a set of people
going to one place (thus distinguishing Kokinda) .3 " The Court then
considered "whether speech activities are compatible with the
purpose of the easement" in light of the fact that the easement was a
traditional public forum, and unavoidably came away with an answer
in the negative: 36  "expressive activities have historically been
compatible with, if not virtually inherent in, spaces dedicated to
general pedestrian passage., 357  Extended consideration of
compatibility may indeed have been unnecessary, as the Ninth Circuit
demonstrated in a subsequent case relying on First Unitarian.
A CL U v. City of Las Vegas dealt with a similar situation: the City
turned several blocks of a downtown street into a pedestrian mall,
contracting with "a private entity, the Fremont Street Experience,
LLC ("FSELLC"), to transform frumpy Fremont Street into the
glamorous Fremont Street Experience [FSE]. '3 58 The City ran into
trouble with the ACLU and others due to a blanket prohibition on
leafleting and soliciting and a prohibition on placing tables, chairs, or
stands unless "authorized by the [FSELLC] for special events.. .or
other commercial and entertainment activities., 359  The plaintiffs'
challenge was clear: "The complaint alleged that FSELLC had
adopted policies prohibiting traditional First Amendment activity on
the Fremont Street Experience. When the ACLU attempted to
"set up a table in order to pass out literature and collect
signatures.. .FSELLC security guards initially ordered the ACLU to
O'Connor's ISKCON concurrence was only the narrowest grounds on the inquiry into the
compatibility of expressive activity with the nature and purpose of a nonpublic forum.
The Court also quoted Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987),
which also dealt with the reasonableness of restrictions in a nonpublic forum.
353. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d. at 1125.
354. Id. at 1126.
355. Id. at 1127-28.
356. It is not clear why the Court felt it necessary to engage in this inquiry, given their
recognition that the "Supreme Court has made clear that once an 'archetype' of a public
forum has been identified, it is not appropriate to examine whether special circumstances
would support downgrading the property to a less protected form." Id. at 1129 n.11.
357. Id. at 1128.
358. 333 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003).
359. Id. at 1095 n.2.
360. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).
leave., 361 The District Court ruled that the FSE was a nonpublic
forum, and granted summary judgment for the City on the solicitation
and tabling prohibitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
FSE was a traditional public forum, because it was "still a street,"
despite the establishment of a privately run pedestrian mall. "Thus,
when a property is used for open public access or as a public
thoroughfare, we need not expressly consider the compatibility of
expressive activity because these uses are inherently compatible with
such activity.,
362
Unfortunately, the positions adopted by the litigants in ACLU v.
Las Vegas render the case only indirect support for an argument that
the First Amendment restricts state actors' assignments of property
rights over a public forum. Neither party contested "the premise that
FSELLC is a state actor" due to its entanglement with the City and
performance of an "exclusively and traditionally public function. ,361
However, the case casts valuable light on the government's ability to
grant private actors property rights because Ninth Circuit expressly
agreed with First Unitarian that it is only with respect to opening
nontraditional fora (designated fora) for discourse that government
intent is relevant.
If the government's intent were a factor in
determining the existence of a traditional public
forum, any new public area, even a new street or park,
could be created as a nonpublic forum as long as the
government's intent to do so were memorialized ...
this result would make a mockery of the protections of
the First Amendment.36
While ACL U does not provide direct precedent, the reasoning of
Venetian Casino, First Unitarian, and ACLU is still instructive: a
private manager of public property performs a traditional
government function any time a private actor exercises power that
can infringe individuals' First Amendment freedoms on public
property (not merely when a private actor performs a host of
traditionally state functions). Furthermore, the State cannot declare
the forum status of property by fiat: the intent of the state (the
361. Id. (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 1101.
363. Id. at 1098 n.5.
364. Id. at 1105.
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'property right' it seeks to grant the private party) is irrelevant to
evaluating the reasonableness of restrictions on speech activity.
These cases reflect an O'Connor-informed application of Marsh: the
character of the invitation extended to the public is determined by the
characteristics and uses of the property itself, not by the asserted
intent of either state or private actors.
The Sixth Circuit recently adopted this precise approach. In
United Church of Christ,365 the Court examined speech restrictions
affecting the sidewalk and common areas surrounding the
professional baseball and basketball stadiums in Cleveland, Ohio.
The restrictions were imposed by a private entity managing private
property. The Defendant argued that the "Gateway Sidewalk", as
the Court termed it, was not a public forum because "the majority of
the Gateway Sidewalk's pedestrians are traveling to and from
[professional baseball] and [professional basketball] games." 366 The
Court refused to accept that the private ownership or the primary use
of the sidewalk removed it from public forum status, however, based
on the sidewalk's integration into the downtown transportation grid
and it's physical similarity to a publicly owned sidewalk.367 Thus, just
as the Ninth Circuit6 and District Courts in the First 369 and Tenth370
had explicitly held on previous occasions, "[b]ecause.. .Gateway
Sidewalk constitutes a public forum, Gateway's operation therein
serves as a public function." Thus, Marsh v. Alabama carried the day,
and Gateway's speech restrictions had to comply with the First
365. United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449 (6th Cir.
2004).
366. Id. at 452.
367. Id. at 453. The Court's opinion was somewhat unclear on whether they were
relying on O'Connor's ISKCON concurrence, or merely (as the Second Circuit has been
accused of doing) paying it lip service and falling back on the "intended" use of the
property. See supra note 168 (noting cases highlighting a disagreement between the
Second Circuit and Ninth and Tenth). However, the Court's refusal to accept the forum
manager's version of the intended purpose of the forum and the Court's reliance on the
actual past use of the sidewalk and the commons areas, the Sixth Circuit is probably best
understood as in the O'Connor camp. See id. at 453-54.
368. Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 2002).
369. Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall
Marketplace, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
370. The Sixth Circuit cited Rouse v. City of Aurora, 901 F. Supp. 1533, 1535-36 (D.
Colo. 1995) as "evaluating plaintiffs' claim that the First Amendment applied to a
privately owned shopping center sidewalk, and observing that 'the linchpin to this claim,
and indeed, to plaintiffs' case theory underlying all claims in this action, is their allegation
that the Granada Park Shopping Center is a public forum."' United Church of Christ, 383
F. 3d at 455.
Amendment because they were a state actor when (and only when)
they engaged in "regulating the public's access to the Gateway
Sidewalk."
37
D. The Limited Implications of Extending Marsh Beyond the Company
Town
One problem with the approach of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits is that it produces an apparently circular inquiry. If an actor
is subject to the constitution's restrictions when managing a property
suitable for discourse, how many land owning private actors will
remain? One could justifiably ask if property owners would be
encouraged to permit no speech activity of any kind for fear that they
will lose control over licensees' access and actions once their property
is deemed "suitable for communication." This issue may be less
intractable than it initially appears, however, and in any event is a
point only marginally relevant to the broadcasting context-the
broadcast spectrum is publicly owned, it is merely managed privately.
The principle advocated is that Marsh should be viewed as restricting
the government's ability to delegate authority over publicly owned
property appropriate for speech activity; it is not necessary to extend
Marsh beyond the First Amendment.3"
Furthermore, when State assigns temporarily the right to use
public property and exclude others, the actions of permit holders do
not constitute state action.373 It is only when a long-term right to use
public land is granted that Marsh, Venetian, First Unitarian, and
ACLU establish that the private actor cannot be granted a right to
deny others their First Amendment freedoms.374 This distinction is
not as unfounded or arbitrary as it may at first appear; it follows from
the fact that the Marsh approach is not applicable to fora dedicated to
371. Id.
372. The Sixth Circuit demonstrated this in United Church of Christ, noting that their
decision had no implications for the "public" status of the Gateway Corporation outside
the limited context of regulating access to a public forum: "our decision in today's case has
no bearing, for instance, on whether, Gateway's employees would receive First
Amendment protection for their workplace speech or whether Gateway would have to
comply with the Due Process Clause when firing a subcontractor. Rather, our holding
today means only that Gateway is a public actor when performing the public function of
regulating the public's access to the Gateway Sidewalk." Id.
373. United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 1995);
Lansing v. Memphis in May Int'l Festival, Inc., 202 F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 2000).
374. See Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002) (4 year lease granting private actor
right to exclude speech activity sufficient to cause private actor to fall within ambit of
Marsh); Faneuil Hall, 745 F. Supp. 65.
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activity inconsistent with expression, as the Court demonstrated in
Lloyd. Perhaps a better way to express it within the jargon of current
doctrine is to say that when the State temporarily assigns the right to
use public property, a limited purpose or nonpublic forum is created.
It is permissible to grant temporary permits to use public property
and exclude others as long as the system for assigning the permits is
content and viewpoint neutral.375 Thus, the right to hold a parade or a
festival can be assigned on a viewpoint-neutral basis, and the public
streets on which the parade is held are legitimately closed to
unwelcome interlopers because for a moment the property is actually
being used in a manner incompatible with unsanctioned speech
activity. When speech activity is indefinitely restricted on publicly
owned property despite the fact that it is compatible with such
activity, however, the First Amendment does not disappear because
the manager of the property is a private corporation.
And certainly Marsh does not require that access be granted to
privately owned property inconsistent with speech activity; the
private owners of property equivalent to a designated or nonpublic
fora-if indeed such equivalents can exist on private property-are
not in danger of being forced to establish nondiscriminatory
conditions for access. Marsh may have been limited to circumstances
where the private property constituted a traditional public forum
precisely to avoid consideration of this issue during a period when the
Court's approach to "designated" public forum analysis was unclear.
Pre-ISKCON public forum cases suggested that the forum status of
public property depended in large part on the uses permitted and the
degree of proprietary control exercised.76 This would obviously raise
the concern that any time a private actor relaxed control over private
property and permitted speech activities, a forum could have been
created, essentially by estoppel. The Court's clarity on this issue,
however, has eliminated this concern: an express dedication by a non-
state owner of property would be necessary to create a designated
public forum, and an express dedication by a private actor motivated
by profit would be nigh impossible. It is a rare parcel of privately
owned land that carries with it an implicit invitation for the public to
use it freely.
375. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (a content-neutral system for
assigning permits to use public land is acceptable if it contains adequate standards and
provides effective judicial review).
376. See generally BeVier, supra note 189.
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Perhaps the exception proves the rule; in Evans v. Newton,377 the
Court held that private trustees controlling a privately owned park
were state actors who could not discriminate on the basis of race. The
situation was essentially sui generis, however. It was motivated
primarily by the Court's belief that the transfer of control from public
to private hands had not been shown to have eliminated the actual
involvement of the city in the daily maintenance and care of the park.
A nonpublic forum located on private property would technically
be impossible. By definition, a nonpublic forum arises when
government property is suitable for and opened for expressive
purposes. Staying strictly within the terms of this definition would
allow private actors to maintain control over almost all private
venues, which should comfort those concerned by an overly broad
reading of Marsh, but the consequences of extending O'Connor's
reasonableness test to privately owned property would not be
disastrous. The commercial character of property informs the
reasonableness of restrictions.378 If the extension of Marsh to
privately owned non-traditional public fora forces the owners of the
"private" properties (such as shopping malls and gated
communities)that have supplanted the public square to provide
viewpoint-neutral reasons for restrictions on speech activity, neither
private rights nor public discourse will necessarily suffer.
VI. Summation
Broadcasters have opened discrete units of time to some
members of the public who wish to engage in communicative activity,
and have closed the airwaves to others. Those excluded seek access
to discrete portions of public property that are a forum of some sort.
The locations to which access is sought are not "traditional public
fora" because the Court has clung to the historical understanding of
that term, but nothing in the Marsh opinion or the line of cases
interpreting it suggests that Marsh is only applicable to traditional
public fora.
In the traditional public forum context courts refuse "to attribute
legal significance to an historical absence of speech activities where
that non-speech history was created by the very restrictions at issue in
the case. 3 79  A similar approach is arguably appropriate in the
377. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
378. See supra note 161.
379. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City, 308 F.3d 1114, 1130 (10th Cir. 2002). See
also Hobbs v. County of Westchester, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13942, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
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broadcasting context; traditional public fora are by definition not
dedicated to a use inconsistent with communicative activity, and the
same can be said of portions of the electromagnetic spectrum
reserved for commercials. A message broadcast over the
electromagnetic spectrum is pure speech, incapable of physically
interfering with a competing activity. It's even speech at perfectly
controlled volume; anyone who wishes not to receive it can avoid it
without significant effort.3" True, it prevents the transmission of a
different message during that same segment of time, but in any forum
the First Amendment clearly demands that conflicting claims of
competing speakers be resolved on some basis other than the forum
manager's aversion to one of the messages. The Supreme Court has
constructed an elaborate body of doctrine qualifying our society's
baseline belief in freedom of expression only because speech activity
generally occurs within an actual physical environment in which
activity designed to communicate all too often produces undesirable
consequences. Once frequencies have been assigned, physical
constraints are sublimely irrelevant to broadcasting, as are doctrines
that allow the manager of a publicly owned property to control
speech activity to limit the negative repercussions speech activity
produces. The reason that speech in a traditional public forum
receives such robust protection (and probably the reason that the
Circuits increasingly demonstrate a concern about the privatization of
public fora) is that those locations are, by presumption, conducive to
speech activity. On the publicly owned airwaves just as in a physical
public forum, unless we are satisfied that the reason speech is
excluded has nothing to do with the viewpoint of the speaker, the
First Amendment does not permit the suppression of speech.
While consistency may thus militate for extending the traditional
public forum approach to the broadcast-access debate, even if the
airwaves are a nonpublic forum the exclusion of speech based upon
viewpoint is impermissible. In the factual context of modern
broadcasting it is irrelevant that current doctrine has not yet
embraced the more speech-enhancing position, "when a space is open
to advertising, to commercial speech, that fact indicates that the space
is not only not disrupted by expressive activity but is conducive to
13, 2003) ("[T]here are significant areas outside the amusement area that have all the
characteristics of a traditional public forum. That the County historically has not
permitted their use in that manner is not relevant to this determination.").
380. See supra notes 198, 201 and accompanying text.
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such activity., 381  First, there is the argument that product
advertisements often implicitly present a viewpoint on controversial
312issues. Second, even if this argument is rejected, broadcasters'
transmission of some "public interest" speech and government
speech,383 as well as candidate and issue ads dealing with elections,
demonstrates that they have waived their claim to exclude an entire
class of speech from the forum because it is "noncommercial" or
"controversial."
Broadcasters cannot claim a right to be free from "forced
speech." A compelled right of access would be constitutionally
suspect where it might have the direct result of distorting a message
(as in Hurley) or the indirect result of discouraging or altering speech
due to fear of response (as in Miami Herald v. Tornillo). Neither set
of concerns is implicated by a right of access to broadcast advertising.
When broadcasters transmit advertisements they serve as conduits,
not speakers-the social understanding is that they are not
associating themselves with the content of the message. The latter
concern is not present in broadcasting absent the Cullman doctrine
because, as the Court recognized in CBS v. FCC, the transmission of
an advertorial "does not impair the discretion of broadcasters to
present their views on any issue.
3 4
VII. Conclusion
When the FCC accepted responsibility for supervising (through
licensees) the balanced presentation of views on the public airwaves,
they were permitted to reject the individualist conception of the First
Amendment in the interest of promoting public debate based on two
implicit assumptions: (1) speech serves only to inform the public
about the existence of viewpoints, and (2) only the broad outlines of a
position must be set forth if the public is to be "informed." These
assumptions are highly suspect from the point of view of both the
liberty tradition and the political tradition, and in the absence of
active efforts at "balancing" through the fairness doctrine, their
381. Air Line Pilots Assoc., Int'l v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1161 (7th Cir.
1995) (Flaum, J., concurring).
382. See supra Part IV.B.2.
383. Press conferences, etc., probably do not count, because they are part of a
broadcaster's actual programming, but surely anti-drug advertorials for which networks
are paid count as government speech. See, e.g., http://www.mediacampaign.org/mg/
television.html.
384. 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981).
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weaknesses render viewpoint-based exclusions from public fora
located on public property constitutionally unacceptable.
The first assumption offends the liberty tradition because it
denies that free speech has an intrinsic value as a vehicle for
individual self-actualization. Surely the right of an individual to be
free from governmental restrictions on expression is valued "both as
an end and as means" at least partly because it is in some sense
necessary to achieve freedom of conscience, not merely because it is
"indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth."'385 To
assert that the exclusive function of the First Amendment is to ensure
an informed public is equivalent to conceding that the sole purpose of
the Fifteenth,386 Nineteenth,"' and Twenty-Sixth3" Amendments is to
ensure that the government is accurately informed about the desires
of citizens. Such a concession implicitly denies that the Constitution
attaches any inherent importance to individuals' active participation
in the business of citizenship-it denies that the Constitution
envisages human aspirations not directly relevant to the process of
making laws. Furthermore, the first assumption offends the political
tradition because it denies that the First Amendment protects speech
because of its potential for persuasion. For language to serve as an
instrument of social change, surely the eloquent must be given the
opportunity to do more than sketch the outlines of their views.
The second assumption is suspect because if (as the FCC once
maintained) only a representative set of viewpoints need be aired on
either side of an issue, there exists almost unlimited potential for
abuse of the licensee's role as moderator. The offense to the liberty
tradition is obvious, while the political tradition may be tempted to
respond, "[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve
higher values."3 89  But in the absence of even an attempt at
supervising the moderator, it is unclear what "higher values" we are
attempting to preserve. It is inconsistent with the general prohibition
385. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
386. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
387. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
388. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
389. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
on prior restraints" to allow any actor unreviewable discretion to
deny others access to a public forum,39 and broadcasters' recent
efforts to silence dissident voices demonstrates the wisdom of this
time-honored and visceral distrust of censorship.
This Article has repeatedly noted the limited nature of the
doctrinal extensions necessary to construct a right of access to the
broadcasting spectrum: CBS v. DNC need not be overruled because it
provides no precedent in the absence of the fairness doctrine;
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights need not be abandoned or even
fundamentally altered, it should simply be limited to situations in
which captive audiences are present; Marsh v. Alabama need only be
read to mean that private corporations can be state actors when First
Amendment rights on publicly owned property are at issue, and even
then only in cases where speech activity cannot interfere with other
activities because the forum at issue is inherently conducive to
speech. These "onlys" are not meant to suggest that access to the
broadcasting spectrum is a minor issue or that judicial recognition of
an individual right of access would represent an insignificant step in
First Amendment jurisprudence. "On the contrary, the right to speak
can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum-
whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a
soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an
effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring
hollow indeed.
392
The relative ease with which an individual right of access can be
plucked from (or perhaps woven into) modern doctrine is instead
emphasized because invitations for more sweeping re-interpretations
of the First Amendment have not been accepted. Professor
Meiklejohn's elegant argument for interpreting the First Amendment
as the constitutionally unique cornerstone of deliberative self-
government simply finds little direct support in federal judiciary's
modern opinions; again and again free speech is treated as an
individual right; sacred primarily because it preserves individual
autonomy. The political tradition is de-emphasized not because
390. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("[A] free
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than
to throttle them and all others beforehand.") (emphasis added); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14, 718-20 (1931).
391. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (any prior restraint begins with "a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity").
392. CBS, 412 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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public debate is unimportant, but rather because our First
Amendment doctrine implicitly assumes that individuals, if free from
restrictions imposed by the State, will fulfill the participatory role that
citizens must play if democracy is to be successful. We assume that
public discourse will remain vital if the judiciary simply wields the
First Amendment in defense of individual liberty, and recent
experience demonstrates that our faith in individuals is not
unfounded; motivated dissidents have time and again demonstrated
their willingness to contribute relevant viewpoints to public debate-
if only we would permit them.
Individuals suffer a constitutionally cognizable harm when they
are denied the ability to access portions of the broadcast spectrum on
terms equal to those granted their ideological opponents, and public
debate suffers as well. The federal judiciary has, thus far, neglected
to invoke the liberty tradition to ensure that individuals are granted
nondiscriminatory access, an abdication of responsibility that
undermines the public's deliberative process, and thus threatens the
aspirations of both the liberty tradition and the political tradition. If,
when the rights of individuals are directly threatened, the liberty
tradition proves unable to support the weighty aspirations of
democratic self-government, perhaps our faith in individuals does not
mandate a concomitant faith in individualism.
